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Introduction 
 
The research in this thesis is conducted to better understand the presence of ethnic violence in 
a society. A lot has been written about ethnic violence, but this research introduces a bottom-
up approach to explain ethnic violence. The question that stands central in this thesis is, does 
civic engagement influence the presence of ethnic violence? In the thesis civic engagement 
refers to civic interaction between ethnic groups. This engagement could take place 
informally, such as children with different ethnic backgrounds playing together on the 
playground, and formally through voluntary associations. It means that people, regardless of 
their ethnicity, interact with each other in their social lives and through social and political 
organizations. The theory was designed by Ashutosh Varshney who applied his theory to 
India and found in the analysis enough evidence to conclude that civic engagement between 
different ethnic groups is essential in understanding the presence of ethnic violence or the 
continuance of ethnic peace in a country. 
The main proposition is that ethnic violence is a manifestation of the absence of 
interethnic civic engagement in a deeply fragmented society. Additionally, the theory predicts 
that when there is interethnic civic engagement, then the outbreak of ethnic violence would be 
less likely. Turning to Varshney’s assumption, he argues that trust and friendly relations 
across ethnic identities will grow as a result of interethnic civic engagement. Subsequently, he 
explains that when there is interethnic civic engagement, political elites and parties will not be 
successful in polarizing ethnic groups to stimulate ethnic violence. The reason is that 
interethnic relations are agents of peace. The mechanisms such as trust, communication, and 
the ability of political elites to polarize ethnic groups are elements from Varshney’s theory 
which are important for this thesis, but these  mechanisms are difficult to measure.  
In order to deal with this difficulty and to be able to understand the role of interethnic 
civic engagement in a fragmented society, the thesis analyzes civic engagement along two 
dimensions of interethnic civic engagement and one dimension of political cooperation. In 
short, three different aspects of society are analyzed. What makes this thesis interesting is that 
it applied the theory of civic engagement to the deviant case of Malaysia. Malaysia is 
categorized as a deviant case by Varshney because he believed that his theory could not 
explain the absence of ethnic violence in this country. In general, scholars disagree on how to 
explain ethnic peace in Malaysia as it is a fragmented society which experienced large scale 
riots and ethnic violence in 1969. However, since 1969 the country became more harmonious 
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and peaceful. Thus, this thesis makes an attempt to use arguments of formal organizations 
from the theory of interethnic civic engagement to explain the ethnic peace in Malaysia. The 
structure of the thesis with the focus on two dimensions of interethnic civic engagement, 
which consider the social and economic spheres of civic life, and an analysis of the 
cooperation between political elites, makes a broad analysis of the ethnic peace in Malaysia 
possible.   
In the social and economic dimensions of interethnic civic engagement, civic 
engagement across ethnic groups will be the focal point, by closely analyzing the education 
system and the business sector in Malaysia. In the dimension of political cooperation attention 
will be drawn to the role of the political system and parties to explain the ethnic peace in 
Malaysia. In the academic literature there are great theories on ethnic violence. One of these 
theories was designed by Arend Lijphart who takes a top-down approach by focusing on the 
political system in order to explain ethnic peace and violence. This approach will also be 
discussed in the thesis. Finally, the thesis will look at the interethnic relations of before and 
after 1969. Especially the post-1969 period is important because radical policies were adopted 
by the Malaysian government which transformed the society.  
Thus, the argument of formal organizations from Varshney’s theory is applied to this 
thesis and researched along the social and economic dimensions. In addition, features of 
Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism are applied to the dimension of political cooperation. 
Interethnic civic engagement along the social and economic dimensions is looked at to detect 
what the role of interethnic relations are in a fragmented society and how that influences the 
presence or absence of ethnic violence. However, by adding the dimension of political 
cooperation, the main objective is to explain the absence of ethnic violence and to draw 
conclusions about the continuance of ethnic peace in Malaysia. The thesis takes a different 
and new approach to research ethnic violence by not strictly focusing on the big theories in 
the academic literature, but instead applying a bottom up approach that has not been widely 
applied. 
The thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter will discuss different theories 
about ethnic violence and will explain the theory of interethnic civic engagement into more 
detail. Subsequently, the second chapter will elaborate on the research strategy with the focus 
on the case study, the methodology, and the data used for the dimensions of interethnic civic 
engagement and political cooperation. Then chapter three will zoom in on the social 
dimension of interethnic civic engagement and analyze whether interethnic civic engagement 
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took place in schools and universities. In chapter four, the focus will be on the economic 
dimension of interethnic civic engagement where the business sector, companies, and the role 
of the government in the economy will be discussed. In chapter five, the dimension of 
political cooperation will be analyzed by looking at the political system and parties in order to 
better understand the ethnic peace in Malaysia. Finally, chapter six will consist of a 
conclusion, answer to the research question, and will elaborate on what the role of interethnic 
civic engagement is in explaining the ethnic peace in Malaysia. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review & Theory 
 
In the academic literature ethnic conflicts and ethnic violence are often, though incorrectly, 
used as synonyms. It is important to bear in mind that ethnic conflict and ethnic violence are 
not the same because ethnic violence is a form of conflict (Brubaker, p.425). An ethnic 
conflict can be described as a situation in which the inequity between groups, caused by 
economic, social, or political deprivation or underdevelopment of the group(s), will lead to 
ethnic mobilization controlled by ethnic elites who seek to increase their power (Horowitz, 
1998, pp.5-9; Gilley, 2004, p.1159). To realize their objectives, these elites could use ethnic 
differences and ancient hatred as a tool to increase the ethnic divide. The thesis looks at ethnic 
violence, also referred to as violent ethnic conflicts. 
Because much is written about ethnic violence, this chapter will begin with three 
different perspectives on ethnic violence and will shed light on why violent ethnic conflicts 
take place. These three theories are Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism which looks 
at power-sharing arrangements and elite cooperation; realism which takes into account certain 
dilemmas, such as the security dilemma; and constructivism which focuses on group identity.  
To begin with Arend Lijphart, in his work he explains Gabriel Almond’s perspective 
on political stability before elaborating on his own theory. Almond argued that countries that 
have leaders of social groups with heterogeneous and overlapping memberships, will feel the 
pressure to take moderate positions concerning policies and in decision-making (Lijphart, 
1969, p.208). Almond’s assumption was that moderation of political elites with cross-cutting 
cleavages would lead to political stability in a democracy (p.209). Following this theory, the 
expectation would be that societies with deep cleavages and few overlapping memberships 
would have political instability.  
However, Lijphart argued that deeply fragmented societies can have a stable 
democratic system. His explanation was based on the power-sharing arrangement that he 
deemed necessary in deeply divided societies to maintain political stability and preserve 
democracy (Norris, 2008, p.103; Lijphart, 1996, p.258). This political system is characterized 
by cooperation between elites/ leaders of different social groups through features such as 
proportional representation, multiparty parliaments, and coalition cabinets (Norris, p.24). This 
arrangement would teach community leaders to cooperate, bargain, and compromise and turn 
a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy, called a consociational democracy 
(Lijphart, 1969, p.216).  
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The theory of consociationalism showed its relevance when it was applied to the case 
of India. It explained the stable democracy in India and other deeply fragmented societies. 
However, Lijphart went a step further in his theory by stating that the cooperation between 
elites would not only create trust at the elite level, but the elite would also be able to promote 
tolerance and accommodation among their followers and reduce or avoid ethnic rebellion 
(Norris, pp.24-25, 105). Indeed, Lijphart’ theory might fare well in explaining why some 
political systems are better in managing ethnic conflicts than others by comparing different 
countries, but his theory does a poor job in explaining the variation of ethnic violence within a 
country (Varshney, 2002, p.27, 38). Lijphart’s assumption is that good relations among 
political elites and their cooperation will trickle down into the fragmented society and 
promote tolerance and conciliation at the mass levels (Norris, p.24). However, according to 
Varshney (p.38), an institutional explanation is based on an electoral design and political 
institutions that apply to a country, but this cannot explain why different parts of one country 
would have different patterns of ethnic violence or peace.  
Turning to a more realist perspective that is often used to explain war dynamics, the 
articles by Barry Posen (1993) and Donald Rothchild and David Lake (1996) are good 
examples. First of all, Posen’s main focus was on the security dilemma of ethnic groups who 
found themselves responsible for their security after the collapse of a regime or empire. For 
him the causes of ethnic violence were fear and the presence of offensive military power 
(1993, p.43). He argued that relative power is important and that in a situation of a balance of 
power violence would not be likely. However, in Sri Lanka, a case where the government 
represented the dominant ethnic group, an ethnic minority (Tamils) was able to engage in 
preemptive attacks against the Sinhalese (Kapferer, 2001, p.34). The power imbalance in 
favor of the Sinhalese, when using Posen’s theory, could not explain the preemptive attacks 
by the ethnic minority.  
Posen focused on intra-ethnic civic relations to explain that a strong group is needed to 
engage in offensive actions. His assumption was that ethnic identities were fixed and self-help 
and survival were the main objectives for group leaders because other ethnic groups could not 
be trusted. He explained the absence of violence based on a balance of power, and did not 
take into account other factors such as the engagement between people from different groups. 
The emphasis on the security dilemma and the lack of trust among groups is a perspective that 
is often used to explain conflicts. However, realism has limited explanatory power because it 
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cannot explain ethnic divisions within a state, as it assumes that the state is an unitary actor 
(Sambanis, 2001, p.263).  
Moving on to Lake and Rothchild, in their article they focused on several dilemmas 
that could cause violent ethnic conflicts. These dilemmas were preemptive use of force; 
information failure; and lack of credible commitments (1996, p.53). Their rational argument 
was that insecurities, self-help, and a cost-benefit calculus could lead to violence. However, 
Varshney argued that a cost-benefit calculus alone could not explain ethnic conflicts. His 
argument was that an ethnic conflict or ethnic mobilization has its origins in value-rational 
behavior, which refers to certain beliefs that drive people to take certain actions (2003, p.86). 
Value-rational behavior is not based on the calculation of benefits and costs. From Varshney’s 
perspective the rational-choice theory shows how leaders manipulate ethnicity to their 
advantage, but fails to explain the cause and sustainability of the ethnic mobilization of people 
(p.95). Therefore, a rationalist theory does not seem fit to answer the research question.  
The constructivist school is quite able in explaining processes that create group 
identities, but constructivists differ in their perspective on the role of ethnic groups in 
conflicts. Stathis Kalyvas explained ethnic defection which means that a person could join an 
organization that is against the ideals of the ethnic group (2008, p.1045). He argued that based 
on ethnicity one’s political behavior cannot be predicted and is not fixed. He seemed skeptical 
about the effect of civic engagement because he believed that organizations and preferences 
of people change during conflicts (p.1063). Therefore, even group cohesion is not guaranteed. 
However, within and outside the constructivist school there are authors who disagree with 
Kalyvas on this issue. 
Donald Horowitz, for example, assumed that boundaries between ethnic groups were 
constructed in social life. Stereotypes could create a strong us-them thinking and lead to 
ethnic conflict and violence (p.20).  In contrast to Kalyvas, Horowitz stressed the within 
group sentiments and cohesion of an ethnic group, and consequently said that political 
mobilization was likely along such ethnic lines. Thus, there is no consensus on whether group 
cohesion is likely and what role ethnic groups play in ethnic conflicts. However, the problem 
with focusing primarily on group cohesion is that it cannot explain whether and how identities 
lead to violence (Dumitru and Johnson, 2011, p.8). Identity shifts, ethnic defection, and the 
hardening of ethnic identities take place depending on the interests of the elites and the group 
members. However, the presence of different identities alone could not be a cause of ethnic 
violence. 
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Some important and leading theories discussed here, tried to explain (violent) ethnic 
conflicts. Yet, none of these theories were complete or satisfying to explain ethnic violence. 
The realist and constructivist approaches did not seem satisfying to explain ethnic violence 
because they look at ethnic groups and the tensions between these groups, but not at how and 
whether these groups interact with each other. The theory of consociationalism is an 
important theory and some elements of this theory will be applied to the case of Malaysia, but 
the theory also has limited explanatory power because of its top-down institutional approach 
to explain ethnic violence. Moreover, the theory is primarily focused on the role of political 
elites in explaining political (in)stability.  
This thesis is focused on civic engagement between ethnic groups because it is 
considered to be a key aspect in understanding why in some cases violent ethnic conflicts 
erupt and in others not. The reason is that civic engagement through formal organizations 
increases the level of trust and communication between ethnic groups. If integrated formal 
organizations are absent, then there are no interethnic platforms to communicate in times of 
tension. Therefore, in addition to Lijphart’s theory and his focus on the political system, it is 
important to look at the work by Ashutosh Varshney, whose theory focuses on how ethnic 
groups interact with each other in order to explain the causal mechanism between interethnic 
civic engagement, on the one hand, and ethnic violence and peace on the other. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
In order to analyze the ethnic peace in Malaysia elements from both Varshney’s and 
Lijphart’s theories will be used.  To begin with Varshney’s theory on civic engagement, he 
focuses on the role of social structures and discourse in ethnic conflicts. He emphasized that 
intra-ethnic and interethnic networks of civic engagement both play different roles in ethnic 
conflicts (2001, p.363). Robert Putnam’s social capital was the spring board for Varshney’s 
civic engagement theory. Following Putnam (1995, p.664), he explained that social capital 
would create social trust. Social trust can be defined as the belief that group X will take care 
of group Y, or at least that X will not harm Y (Axford, 2002, p.135). The perception was that 
interethnic civic engagement would create social trust.  
Varshney (2001, p.363) looks at two types of civic engagement in a multi-ethnic 
society. These are intra-ethnic and interethnic networks of civic engagement. Both these 
networks consist of informal and formal civic interaction. Informal refers to everyday forms 
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of engagement and takes place on a small-scale, such as dinners. Formal civic interaction 
refers to business associations and film clubs that are organizations on a larger scale which 
connect more people. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba also looked at voluntary 
associations, but they understood these organizations as a way for individuals to be involved 
in the political system, even though these associations do not have to be related to politics 
(1963, p.300-301). Varshney, on the other hand, perceives associational membership as a way 
for different ethnic groups to engage with each other, which ultimately can facilitate 
communication and create trust among communal groups.  
 The assumption is that ethnic identities are strong, an example is India where the 
identities of Muslims and Hindus created clear boundaries between the groups. In such a 
situation it is likely that there is intra-ethnic civic engagement because of the similarities that 
the group members share. However, Varshney emphasized that interethnic formal 
organizations were sturdier in influencing ethnic violence. His assumption is that interethnic 
formal organizations could act as a serious constraint on polarizing strategies of political 
parties or elites, who would benefit from tensions between ethnic groups (2005, p.15). 
The importance of interethnic relations is that they are agents of peace because 
interethnic civic engagement makes sure that people from different ethnic groups know each 
other, it creates room for communication in times of tension, and does not allow space for 
rumors to become a vehicle for ethnic conflict or escalation of the conflict into ethnic violence 
(Varshney, 2001, p.375). If interethnic civic engagement is present in a society, tensions and 
conflicts can be managed despite increasing hostilities and rumors, but if absent, ethnic 
violence becomes more likely (p.378). The argument is that if there are ethnic tensions, a 
society that is strictly based on intra-ethnic civic engagement will face violence, whereas a 
society that is based on interethnic civic engagement will experience ethnic peace (p.379). 
The dynamics between groups is central in the thesis to understand why violence is 
present or absent in a multi-ethnic society. The central element of Varshney’s theory that will 
be used in this thesis are formal organizations in civic life in order to understand the role of 
interethnic civic engagement in the Malaysian society and its influence on ethnic violence. 
These organizations are important for interethnic peace as they connect a large number of 
people. Civic life is something that exists between the state, on the one hand, and families on 
the other, and is relatively independent of the state. Civic engagement allows people to come 
together for different public activities in a non-state space, but this space can cover both social 
and political activities (Varshney, 2002, p.4).  
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In addition, the political system is also considered important in understanding the 
absence or presence of ethnic violence in a fragmented society, such as Malaysia. As 
Varshney’s theory does not cover the political system in detail, Lijphart’s theory of 
consociationalism will be consulted. To analyze the role of Malaysia’s consensus democracy 
in ethnic violence some features of the theory of consociationalism, such as proportional 
representation, coalition cabinets, and cultural autonomy for ethnic groups (Lijphart, 1996, 
p.258), will be used to explain the ethnic peace in Malaysia. All these aspects involve political 
compromises and cooperation among political elites. However, it is important to remember 
that, according to this model, political elites cooperate because it is the only solution in a 
fragmented society to govern the country and transform a fragmented political culture into a 
stable democracy (Lijphart, 1969, p.216). 
Concerning the political sphere, Varshney explains that ethnic parties will tend to use 
polarizing strategies if this works in their benefit to increase electoral support, whereas 
genuine nationalist parties would try to reach out to all the people in a society to generate 
greater support for their party. This is where both Varshney’s and Lijphart’s ideas show 
similarity. However, it is important to keep in mind that there are also differences between the 
ideas of these scholars which increase the understanding of why elements of both theories are 
used in this thesis. To give an overview of these differences, one of the arguments in the 
theory of consociationalism is that different ethnic groups engage within their own group and 
not across groups (p.49). The latter is evident for one of the core features of the consociational 
theory that underlines segmented autonomy for education and language (p.37). 
Additionally, this also hints at another difference between Varshney and Lijphart on 
how they perceive ethnic relations. Lijphart believes that cooperation between political elites 
will trickle down and create harmony and lead to conciliation at the mass levels. In contrast, 
Varshney believes that civic engagement through formal organizations will bring people with 
different ethnicities together and make cooperation and communication possible. Due time, 
this will create strong interethnic relations which will make ethnic violence less likely because 
people know and trust each other, and are able to communicate in times of tension.  
It is clear that Lijphart has a top down approach, whereas Varshney has a more 
bottom-up approach that underlines the creation of interethnic relations instead of merely 
accepting the cooperation among political elites as the source of good interethnic relations. 
Next to the similarities and differences, their approaches are, to some extent, also 
complementary. The institutional approach of Lijphart where the focus is on political elites, 
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proportional representation, and multiparty coalitions is essential for the dimension of 
political cooperation in the thesis. However, to understand the relations between ethnic groups 
at the mass levels, the thesis has to go beyond Lijphart’s assumption that elites will generate 
harmony and conciliation. This is why Varshney’s interethnic civic engagement is important 
for the thesis and is complementary to the well established theory of consociationalism.  
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Chapter 2: Research Strategy 
 
The main proposition is: If there is interethnic civic engagement, ethnic violence is less likely 
to occur. The research question, “does civic engagement influence the presence of ethnic 
violence”, gives the thesis a specific focus, i.e. to analyze whether the main factor of interest, 
interethnic civic engagement, has influence on preventing ethnic violence in times of ethnic 
tension. Before moving on, it is important to define the concepts of ethnic violence and 
ethnicity. Starting with ethnic violence, the definition by Fearon is followed. A violent attack 
can be perceived as ethnic violence ‘if it is motivated by hostility towards ethnic others; the 
victims are chosen by ethnic criteria; or the attack is made in the name of an ethnic group’ 
(Fearon, 2004, p.5). Furthermore, ethnicity can be based on language, race, religion, and sect 
(Varshney, 2001, p. 366). ‘Ethnic’ in ethnic conflict will be used in this broader sense. 
The proposition forces the researcher to look at interethnic civic ties and whether they 
are strong enough to prevent ethnic violence. There are three mechanisms that can explain the 
logic behind the proposition. First of all, it is likely that interethnic civic engagement will 
create trust between ethnic groups. In the academic literature there are different perspectives 
on this. From the realist perspective, other ethnic groups can never be trusted and their 
security undermines the security of one’s own ethnic group. However, Varshney argued that 
civic engagement allows people to know each other, which creates trust, and thus makes 
ethnic violence less likely.  
Secondly, it is likely that interethnic civic engagement will facilitate communication. 
Civic engagement creates familiarity and platforms for communication. This might prevent 
rumors from escalating a situation or conflict. Without communication between ethnic groups, 
intra-ethnic cohesion could have great influence on reframing a conflict by using historical 
narratives. Communication and platforms in times of tension allow different ethnic groups to 
talk to each other instead of allowing rumors or a strong us-them thinking to worsen the 
situation. Nevertheless, rational-choice theory would say that groups make rational choices 
and resort to violence if they calculate that this is the best way to deal with ethnic tensions.  
Thirdly, it is likely that interethnic civic engagement through formal organizations 
would act as a constraint on polarizing strategies of political elites. In countries there are 
political elites who benefit from ethnic differences. However, if there is interethnic civic 
engagement then rumors spread by elites could create ‘sparks’, which means friction, but does 
not have to lead to the escalation of a situation (Varshney, 2005, p.17). The theory of 
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Varshney argues that if there is an integrated civic society, then people from different ethnic 
groups will find ways, for example through peace committees, to talk with each other and 
solve their issues. However, in the academic literature there is the problem of credible 
commitments and this dilemma is aggravated by political elites who feed mistrust between the 
ethnic groups. 
These three mechanisms lie at the heart of Varshney’s theory and indicate that 
interethnic civic engagement is important. The objective of the thesis is to explain the ethnic 
peace in Malaysia by using the argument of formal organization from Varshney’s theory and 
by going beyond his approach by also incorporating important features of Lijphart’s theory. 
The case selected for this thesis is Malaysia, which was categorized as a deviant case by 
Varshney. He argued that his theory could not explain the ethnic peace in Malaysia because 
the Malays and Chinese lived separately from each other and did not engage through formal 
organizations (2005, p.21). Varshney’s theory would predict ethnic violence in Malaysia, but 
the country experienced ethnic peace since 1969. However, on a closer look, the Malaysian 
society is not completely segregated and for this reason this case is considered relevant to 
study whether interethnic civic engagement influences the absence or presence of ethnic 
violence. Additionally, the case of Malaysia could also serve to either conclude that the theory 
is not applicable to this independent case, or identify other causal mechanisms that might 
affect ethnic peace and violence. 
To conduct the research, the process-tracing method will be applied to identify the 
causal chain between interethnic civic engagement and the absence or presence of ethnic 
violence. In particular, this will be done by looking at historical events, facts, and variables 
that might also affect ethnic violence. The most important historical events that took place in 
Malaysia were the Malay-Chinese riots in Penang (1967) and in Kuala Lumpur (1969). 
However, these riots did not lead to an ethnic civil war or continuance of ethnic violence. 
Despite existing ethnic tensions between the Malays and Chinese, these two ethnic groups 
lived peacefully together since 1969. Therefore, it is important to look closely at what caused 
the ethnic peace after 1969. 
In Varshney’s theory and case studies the relevance of peace committees is 
emphasized. These committees create a platform in times of ethnic tension for people to 
communicate with each other. Such committees are easier to establish in an integrated civic 
society, but could also be organized in deeply fragmented societies. However, it is not 
sufficient to merely look at whether peace committees were established in Penang and Kuala 
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Lumpur before and after the riots. Even though, these committees facilitate communication, 
they are primarily effective when there is interethnic civic engagement. In addition, the thesis 
does not only focus on the level of communication, but has a wider focus on interethnic civic 
engagement to explain the absence of ethnic violence in Malaysia.  
The theory of Varshney is based on the assumptions that interethnic civic engagement 
affects the level of interethnic trust and interethnic communication, and the ability of political 
elites to use polarizing strategies in order to gain electoral advantage by making use of the 
fragmentation in a society. These mechanisms cannot be easily investigated because they are 
difficult to define and measure. Therefore, the focus will be on the two dimensions of 
interethnic civic engagement and the dimension of political cooperation to find evidence for 
the relationship between interethnic civic engagement and the absence or presence of ethnic 
violence in a country, and to explain the ethnic peace in Malaysia. Varshney (2005, p.17) 
focuses on ethnically integrated formal organizations, such as business associations; trade 
unions; political parties; and lawyers associations. These types of organizations will be looked 
at in the social and economic dimensions of interethnic civic engagement.  
To summarize, in this thesis Varshney’s theory is taken a step further by including the 
dimension of political cooperation. This dimension does not seem to be completely covered in 
Varshney’s work, therefore, some elements of Lijphart’s theory will be considered for the 
analysis on the ethnic peace in Malaysia.  Combining this with Varshney’s theory allows the 
researcher to take into account the role of political elites, multiparty coalitions, and 
proportional representation in the thesis.  
 
Case Study  
The case of Malaysia is used to research whether interethnic civic engagement can indeed 
prevent ethnic violence. Malaysia is chosen because its ethnic peace has puzzled many 
scholars and therefore a different approach is taken with the aim of explaining this ethnic 
peace. The time period before 1969 will be briefly discussed in each chapter, but the main 
focus will be on the time period between 1969 and 1987 because after the riots a number of 
radical measures were taken by the government to prevent the outbreak of ethnic violence. 
These measures were part of the National Economic Policy (NEP) that introduced some 
fundamental changes in the country and therefore this time period is important for the thesis. 
The radical policies and their long-term effects stand central in the research. Furthermore, this 
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time period is useful because enough time elapsed between 1969 and 1987 to give a clear idea 
about the ethnic relations. This will increase the understanding about the ethnic peace in 
Malaysia.  
In deeply divided societies, organizations are often organized along ethnic lines. The 
policies adopted by the government after the anti-Chinese riots in 1969, resulted in an 
increased privileged position of the Malays (Harff and Gurr, 2004, p.79). However, despite 
these policies, the country experienced peace. To understand this peace, the social dimension 
of interethnic civic engagement should be looked at to reflect on the changes in this 
dimension. Education is seen as an important arena because the underlying assumption is that 
when children attend ethnically mixed schools or universities this will lead to civic 
engagement. According to Francis Fukuyama (2001, p.18), educational institutions pass on 
social rules and norms. Education in Malaysia saw many changes which increased the 
enrollment of Malays and decreased the enrollment of Chinese in universities (Horowitz, 
1985, p.660).  
Furthermore, public universities in Malaysia would be expected to be ethnically 
mixed.  Therefore, the focus will be on how these different groups engaged with each other in 
universities by looking at the language of instruction and student enrollment. Additionally, 
attention will be drawn to how primary and secondary schools were organized and whether 
there were opportunities in the education system for ethnic groups to engage with each other 
after the riots of 1969.  
In Malaysia the business sector was dominated by the Chinese, who were also highly 
educated. However, since the government implemented policies to increase the involvement 
and share of the Malays, i.e. the bumiputras (sons of soil), in business, the position of the 
Chinese in the business sector changed. In addition, the government focused on the education 
of the Malays especially for the business sector in order to create a successful Malay business 
community. However, the Chinese continued to play a role in business because they had the 
know-how, hence the Malays and Chinese found ways to engage with each other in this sector 
through joint ventures. Furthermore, to understand how civic engagement took place in the 
economic dimension, it is also essential to look at formal organizations, which are trade 
unions and chambers of commerce. Researching how the ethnic groups in Malaysia organized 
themselves is relevant as it is part of civic life in a society.   
To illustrate this point, it is important to realize that business associations, such as 
chambers of commerce, in Malaysia were not strictly organized along ethnic lines. Instead 
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Malaysia had both ethnic and national chambers of commerce. This could be an example of 
an association where people with different ethnic backgrounds came together to talk and do 
business. Thus, Varshney’s assumption that Malaysia is strictly ethnically segregated does not 
seem to hold when looking at these chambers. The economic dimension of interethnic civic 
engagement is one of the central aspects of the thesis because it allows the researcher to 
analyze how interethnic civic engagement manifested itself in the business sector and related 
associations.  
Despite the increasing discrimination against, primarily, the Chinese, Malaysia was 
categorized as a partly free (Freedom House) but consociational democracy. As mentioned, 
political elites can have a great influence on ethnic groups. In particular, the organization of 
the political parties, i.e. whether they are based along ethnic or nationalist lines, political 
elites, and elections are looked at to understand how the multi-ethnic government coalitions 
were formed. Besides interethnic civic engagement, the interethnic coalitions in Malaysia are 
considered important as a further constraint on the polarizing strategies of elites.  
 
Scope and Limitations 
There are also some limitations of this thesis. First of all, Varshney was concerned about the 
endogeneity problem (p.389). He posed the question, did interethnic civic ties prevent 
violence or did violence destroy these interethnic civic ties in other places? This endogeneity 
concern is not an issue in this thesis because the aim is to look at civic engagement between 
different ethnic groups over a certain time period. Thus, turning to the actual limitations of 
this thesis, the case of Malaysia is unique in many ways as it is a semi-democracy and to some 
extent fragmented, but at the same time experienced ethnic peace. The combination of these 
factors makes the research on ethnic peace challenging. Also, combining features of two 
theories could provoke criticism as one could say that this would mean that any case could be 
explained by combining some elements of different theories. However, Malaysia is such a 
different case that not one theory can explain the ethnic peace in the country. In addition to 
that, the thesis also shows that the two theories used here have overlapping ideas but are also 
complementary to each other.  
Another issue is that because of the uniqueness of the case study, it is difficult to 
generalize from the outcomes of the thesis. As a result, for each case study where interethnic 
civic engagement is analyzed, it will be difficult to speculate what the expected outcomes will 
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be. Finally, in each thesis the problem remains that additional variables might explain the 
outcome. Therefore, more research on this topic, where interethnic civic engagement is 
related to the likelihood of ethnic violence or peace, is necessary. Furthermore, more research 
on partly free consensus democracies are needed as these cases do not perfectly fit one 
specific theory. This might lead to new perspectives on ethnic peace or violence in such 
countries. 
 
Data  
The dimensions of interethnic civic engagement and political cooperation function as a 
guideline to isolate the factors of interest for the thesis. In order to get a clear perspective on 
Malaysia for the time period of 1967-1987, secondary literature, for example by Horowitz 
(1985 and 1989), will be consulted to understand the processes at play in the country. 
Secondary literature is relevant to put the formal organizations, which the thesis looks at, in a 
broader context and understand what the value of these specific organizations are.  
To do the analysis, background information on the case study is not sufficient to 
answer the research question. Therefore, the social dimension of interethnic civic engagement 
focuses on education. Next to the changes in education policies, it is important to look at the 
school system and to compare the educational differences between ethnic groups. Academic 
articles on the education system will be used to conduct the research. Malaysia was 
characterized by ethnic segregation in the education system and therefore it is important to 
research whether improvement in civic engagement took place in schools and universities 
after 1969.  
In addition, in the discussion about the business sector, the chapter on the economic 
dimension of interethnic civic engagement will pay attention to the chambers of commerce 
and trade unions. Chambers of commerce are important business associations. The chambers 
of commerce that should be looked at are the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Malaysia (NCCIM), but equally important are the ethnic chambers of commerce. The latter 
could obstruct interethnic civic engagement. Trade unions are an essential element of the 
freedom of association. For Malaysia, information on the organization and functioning of 
trade unions can be found on the Malaysian Trade Union Congress and the International 
Labor Organization websites. However, to get more in-depth knowledge on whether the trade 
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unions represent the citizens in Malaysia or whether it is in practice segregated, secondary 
literature such as academic articles will also be used. 
Turning to the dimension of political cooperation, features of the consociational 
democracy will be discussed by consulting the academic work by Lijphart (1996) and Norris 
(2008). This will be complemented by research projects that underline the discrimination 
against the Chinese, and the restraints on political freedom in Malaysia. For the latter, the 
Freedom House annual reports can be used. In addition, it is also important to look at the 
constitution of Malaysia to analyze whether the level of inequality between the Malays and 
the Chinese is violating the constitution. 
Finally, to measure ethnic violence the focus is on riots as the form of ethnic violence 
within a state. The Minorities at Risk (MAR) qualitative dataset, constructed by Ted Gurr and 
associates, will be consulted. The MAR dataset gives background information on, amongst 
others, the case of Malaysia. The MAR dataset is important because based on a set of 
variables, predictions are made about whether ethnic violence is likely by focusing primarily 
on ethnic minorities and their activities and status in a country. These predictions can be 
translated and implemented into the qualitative research of this thesis.  
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Chapter 3: Interethnic Civic Engagement in the 
Education System 
 
The social dimension of interethnic civic engagement looks primarily at the education system 
in Malaysia. It is an important dimension because the education system is a key player in 
spreading norms and values in a society and is a platform for young Malaysians to engage 
with each other and get acquainted with other cultures and ethnicities. In order to focus on 
interethnic civic engagement, the chapter looks at the pre-1969 and post-1969 periods. During 
colonialism and before 1969, schools were segregated along ethnic lines and little effort was 
put in creating opportunities for ethnic groups to engage with each other. However, after the 
riots of 1969, the government put a lot of money and energy in educating the Malays that also 
led to discrimination against Chinese students. 
The NEP promoted the idea that education would create national unity in Malaysia.  
Even though Varshney argued that Malaysia is ethnically segregated, the government policies 
in the post-1969 period tried to encourage interethnic civic engagement by using education as 
a tool to create national unity. This chapter analyzes the changes in the education system as a 
result of the NEP. However, the research will show that one of the main problems with the 
education system was that alternative schools were allowed and ethnic segregation in primary 
education was accepted. These alternative schools, together with the positive discrimination 
of Malays, limited the ability of the education system to create opportunities for children and 
students to engage with each other across ethnic lines.  
 This chapter will first discuss the riots of 1967 in Penang and the constitution of 
Malaysia. These aspects will increase the understanding of how the Malaysian society looked 
like before 1969, but also what long term effects the constitution had. Furthermore, the 
organization of the education system and education policies before 1969 will be elaborated 
on. Then the effect of the NEP on the education system will be explained which took place 
after 1969, followed by the effects of the NEP on interethnic civic engagement in schools and 
universities. 
 
Pre-1969 Period 
In Malaysia, Malay versus Chinese riots took place incidentally. The two evident examples 
are the riots of 1967 in Penang and 1969 in Malaysia. The riots in Penang indicated that 
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ethnic tensions existed within the Malaysian society after independence in 1957, but a “spark” 
was needed to incite these interethnic hostilities. After the riots, an official report showed that 
29 people were killed and 200 injured (Snider, 1968, p.966).  
The unrest in Penang began as a reaction to the devaluation of the Malaysian dollar by 
the government. Basically, the economic situation in Penang was precarious and all ethnic 
groups suffered from this. The Chinese were the dominant ethnic group in Penang and they 
announced a general strike against the government. However, the situation led to ethnic 
tensions when the Malays resisted Chinese enforcement of the strike (Horowitz, 2001, p.378-
379). There was no clear reason for ethnic violence to erupt. As Penang had a racially tense 
atmosphere, the frustration about the economic situation was overshadowed by communal 
violence (Snider, p.965). Eventually, a twenty-four hour curfew and strong police efforts 
restored the order.   
 In the late 1960s, dissatisfaction was greatest among the Malays in Malaysia. To 
understand this dissatisfaction and ethnic tensions, it is important to look at the education 
system during the colonial period and the “social contract” in the constitution of 1957. During 
the British rule, the British allowed primary education in the vernacular. This resulted in an 
education system with four different language streams, i.e. Malay, Tamil, English, and 
Chinese. There was also English education which allowed access to post-secondary education, 
but access was limited and not meant for the Malays (Ahmat, 1980, p.728). The reason was 
that the Malays were peasants and rural based, thus their primary education was meant to 
preserve their traditional ways of life. However, the Chinese were the immigrants and they 
came to dominate the economic sector in cities, which was encouraged by the British. English 
and Chinese primary and secondary education were accessible to the urban Chinese group. 
The British policy was to keep the education system segregated and, subsequently, this 
prevented interethnic civic engagement between the Malays, Chinese, and Indians (p.728).  
 Thus, during the colonial period the British contributed to the ethnic segregation of 
Malaysia as part of their divide-and-rule policy (Raman and Sua, 2010, p.119). The ethnic 
groups were separated by language, religion and customs, and their relations with the British. 
Put simply, ethnic segregation led to the Chinese engaging in trade and capital and forming 
the capitalist class, the Indians working on the rubber plantations and in civil service, and the 
Malays living in the rural areas for fishing and farming (Lee, 1997, pp.28-29). The ethnic 
segregation was more or less maintained until 1969. 
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During the negotiations on independence, the Malays made up about 49.8%, the 
Chinese accounted for 37.2%, and the Indians for 11.3% of the population (Singh and 
Mukherjee, 1993, p.90). Thus, the Malays were the largest ethnic group in Malaysia. 
Independence of Malaysia was possible only if the ethnic groups would agree on how the 
political and economic power would be organized. A bargain was agreed upon and it implied 
that the Chinese would maintain their economic power and have only limited political power, 
while the Malays would maintain political power and only have limited economic safeguards 
(Milne, 1970, p.564). In addition, the constitution of 1957 contained a few articles that 
reflected on this bargain. First of all, article 153 and 69 said that the Malays would be 
guaranteed a special position; article 152 implied that Bahasa Malaysia (Malay) would be the 
national language; and article 11 stated that religious freedom would be guaranteed 
(Saravanamuttu, 2009, p.88). The constitution was popularly termed as the “social contract”. 
The belief was that this interethnic constitutional arrangement led to the harmonious and 
consociational Malaysia, at least until the riots broke out in the late 1960s (p.89). 
Following the social contract, the preservation of languages and cultures of non-
Malays were also promised. Respect for different languages, cultures, and personal laws is 
also included in Lijphart’s theory (1996, p.260). Vernacular education was maintained after 
1957. As a result, at the time of independence, there were 2144 national primary schools 
(Malay as the medium of instruction), 1275 Chinese and 898 Tamil primary schools (Raman 
and Sua, p.119). As most secondary education of high quality was in English, primarily the 
urban Chinese enrolled in these schools, which enabled them to be educated for the modern 
sector jobs and take advantage of the industrialization in the country. Consequently, the 
Chinese continued to further develop themselves through education and dominate the 
economy. The point is that the education system, which was maintained after independence, 
shows that there were no attempts made to break down the social and economic differences 
which increased the ethnic divide between the ethnic groups (Singh and Mukherjee, p.90). 
However, in 1961 the Education Act was introduced. The secondary education 
consisted of three types, where the medium of instruction was Malay, English, and Chinese. 
Not all Chinese were involved in the economic sector as some were rural based.  Chinese 
secondary education, which was booming, was particularly appealing to this Chinese 
subgroup. Nevertheless, the government perceived the increase in Chinese secondary schools 
as problematic. Thus, the education policy implied that Malay would be the medium of 
instruction, conform article 152 of the constitution, in secondary schools to the aim of 
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strengthening national integration (Raman and Sua, p.120). The government would provide 
for public funding if the secondary schools would accept Malay as the language of instruction 
and implement a common national curriculum and public examinations (Lee, 1997, p.29). The 
social contract and Education Act still apply to Malaysia. 
 To be considered for public funding, many Chinese secondary schools changed the 
medium of instruction to English and later to Malay, these schools were called national-type 
Chinese schools. Only in the 1970s did the government convert all English medium secondary 
schools into Malay medium secondary schools (Raman and Sua, p.121). However, making 
Malay the medium of instruction did not end or decrease ethnic segregation. The reason is 
that Chinese children would still go to these Chinese schools because their own language and 
culture continued to be part of the curriculum (p.120). Furthermore, the primary schools 
remained unchanged and education in different languages persisted.  
Moreover, in the tertiary education before 1969, the ethnic differences were also 
prevalent. To give an idea, between 1963 and 1964 the percentage of Malays enrolled in 
tertiary education was 20.6% against 60% of Chinese students (p.129). In addition, education 
in universities was in English which benefitted the more prosperous Chinese, who also went 
to English secondary schools. Again this indicates that the Education Act was insufficient 
because the full implementation took some years and the primary and tertiary education 
systems were not changed. 
These increasing educational and related economic inequalities in Malaysia added up 
to the frustration of the Malays. The general feeling was that the government did little to 
improve the position of the Malays. This dissatisfaction resulted in riots in 1967 and 1969. 
The situation in Penang and Kuala Lumpur were such that Malay frustration could be 
expressed through anti-Chinese riots. What happened in Kuala Lumpur took place in light of 
the elections where the Alliance, which was the ruling multiethnic coalition since 
independence, was on the defensive. This resulted in general confusion about who would win 
the elections. The new developments in the political dimension intensified the ethnic tensions 
between the Malays and Chinese. It seemed as if the elections were a catalyst where old 
feelings of mistrust and new frustrations, fed by ethnic segregation in education and the 
economic sector, won ground and turned into ethnic violence.  
Despite the social contract and constitutional arrangement in favor of the Malays, the 
Malays were not satisfied because their position in the society did not improve and they 
blamed the Chinese and their economic hegemony for this (Singh and Mukherjee, p.90). The 
27 
 
latter was becoming a big problem because until 1969, no successful attempts were made to 
encourage interethnic civic engagement between Malays and Chinese to create trust and end 
the segregation.  
 
Post-1969 Period 
Immediately after the riots of 1969, the government took some short-term measures and in 
July 1969, the department of National Unity was established. This department had to create 
goodwill committees. These committees were a subtype of what Varshney calls peace 
committees (2002, p.15). The objective of the goodwill committees was to promote goodwill 
among ethnic groups and organize voluntary work to reconcile local differences (Saad, 1982, 
p.249). These committees were only making little progress and it was replaced in 1974 by a 
Community Relations Program. The program underlined the importance of bringing people 
with different ethnicities together to create a greater understanding. The belief was that 
prejudices were the product of ignorance and fear and, as a result, the absence of unity 
threatened Malaysia’s survival as a nation (p.251). The ideas of the Community Relations 
Program are in line with Varshney on why interethnic civic engagement is essential. One of 
the solutions proposed was to create unity by using education as an instrument. The latter was 
already put in practice by the National Economic Policy in 1970. 
In similar situations, like in India, several cities experienced ethnic violence and peace 
against a background of increasing ethnic hostilities across the country. A relationship was 
discovered that in cities with a vicious circle of violence the level of interethnic civic 
engagement was low (Varshney, 2002, p.149-150). This resulted in communal segregation in 
the education system with schools, universities, and student bodies representing one specific 
ethnic group. Because of the segregation, thousands of students in these institutions lost the 
opportunity to interact with other ethnic groups (p.151).  
 The riots of 1969 made the country realize that the problems between the ethnic 
groups and socio-economic underdevelopment of the Malays were serious issues which had to 
be dealt with. Therefore, a number of long-term reforms were introduced through the NEP. 
The NEP emerged from the Second Malaysia Plan in 1970. The NEP consisted of measures to 
eradicate poverty and restructure the society. The latter implied that the government wanted to 
achieve interethnic parity in education, occupation, and corporate wealth (Lee, p.30).  The 
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logic of the government was that this would create national unity (Singh and Mukherjee, p.90-
91).  
Only after 1969 did the special position of the Malays come to the fore because of the 
educational and economic opportunities they were increasingly offered. The underlying idea 
was that better education for the Malays would end the inequality in the society and therefore 
improve ethnic relations (p.92). There was a strong dislike of ethnic segregation in the 
education system because it was seen as exaggerating prejudice, fear, and hostility between 
the Malays and Chinese (Chai, 1971, p.39). 
 The relationship between ethnicity and economic status was considered dangerous 
and, therefore, the Third Malaysian plan, consistent with the NEP, was aimed at developing 
the higher education (Ahmat, p.723). According to this plan, the universities had certain 
objectives, for example contributing to national integration and unity through teaching in 
Malay; and increasing Malay enrollment in universities to create equality in jobs and 
occupations at all levels (p.724). Universities were valued by the government as an essential 
instrument and, therefore, between 1969 and 1973, four new public universities were 
established. These public universities would promote ethnic understanding as both Malay and 
non-Malay students would enroll in these institutions and thus get the opportunity to interact 
with each other (p.736). 
The policies implemented between 1970 and 1990, the period between the First and 
Fifth Malaysian Plans, changed the education system considerably. As the aim was to create 
national unity through education, a national ideology was spread within secondary schools. 
This ideology promoted and consisted of shared values, like the belief in God, rule of law, and 
good behavior, in order to establish a united nation with a just and liberal multicultural society 
(UNDP). The Third, Fourth and Fifth Malaysian Plans followed the NEP objectives and 
measures were taken to make education for the poor more accessible; improve the teaching 
and learning process; and improve the curriculum for the primary schools.  
The result of the NEP was that by 1982 all English medium primary and secondary 
schools were transformed into Malay medium secondary schools which was a great advantage 
for the Malays because it increased their access to schools (Singh and Mukherjee, p.91). The 
downside was that the English primary schools were the only schools that were interethnic. 
Thus, making Malay the medium of instruction backfired as a policy in the primary education 
because interethnic English schools disappeared (Raman and Sua, p.119).  
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Furthermore, a quota system for universities was installed under the NEP. The quota 
system ratio was 55:45 in favor of the Malays, but in practice the Malay enrollment was 70% 
(Harff and Gurr, 2004, p.79). This quota had great consequences as it increased the 
enrollment of Malays in universities to 63% in 1975, whereas the Chinese enrollment 
decreased to 31%, this remained more or less the same in the public universities until the 
explosive growth in number of private universities in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Raman 
and Sua, p.129). The government also awarded scholarships and these were primarily meant 
for the Malays as they were rewarded 90% of the scholarships (CPPS). 
 
Interethnic Civic Engagement 
The NEP definitely improved the position of the Malays in schools by giving them better 
 access to secondary and tertiary education. The first impression is that the national 
curriculum in primary schools, the national language in secondary schools, and the 
establishment of public universities between 1970 and 1990 increased the enrollment of 
Malays into the education system and thus would allow them to engage with the Chinese as a 
step towards creating national unity. Nevertheless, the results of the NEP policies to change 
the education system did not end the ethnic segregation. The positive discrimination of 
Malays had a negative effect on the opportunities for the Chinese in higher education.   
One of the consequences was the growth in number of private universities in the 
1980s. The aim of private universities was not to diversify the tertiary education, but to fulfill 
the high Chinese demand for these institutions (Horowitz, 1985, p.661). The private 
universities worsened the ethnic divide, as 90% of the students were non-Malay (Raman and 
Sua, p.122-123). These universities were not to blame for the lack of interethnic civic 
engagement in the education system because, at the same time, the government allowed 
positive discrimination in favor of the Malays and the establishment of the International 
Islamic University in 1983, which was meant for the Malays.  
Turning to the secondary schools, it is a fact that the four separate school systems with 
different curricula, as they existed before 1969, completely obstructed interethnic civic 
engagement. The Education Act and the NEP tried to create national secondary schools, but 
also allowed alternative schools in all levels of education to fulfill the needs of the ethnic 
groups (p.118). As part of the NEP, efforts were made to increase the supply of schooling 
places in rural areas, which would benefit the rural-based Malays. Next to the national 
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secondary schools, residential MARA Junior Science Colleges were established, almost 
exclusively for Malay students (p.125). The objective of these schools was to focus on science 
and technical education and by 2007 there were 54 of these schools (p.121). Clearly, Islamic 
and MARA residential schools did not allow the creation of interethnic civic ties between 
Malays and Chinese.  
In addition, the privatization of the education system led to the establishment of 
private secondary schools. To begin with Chinese as the medium of instruction, 53 Chinese 
independent secondary schools were established (Lee, p.36). Furthermore, 118 private 
secondary schools were set up with Malay or English as the medium (Idem). Finally, 
international schools were also founded in Malaysia.  
As for the primary education, 93% of the Malays attended national schools, 90% of 
the Chinese attended Chinese-national schools, and 70% of Indians attend Tamil-national 
schools (CPPS).  These percentages show that the primary education was extremely 
segregated along ethnic lines. In contrast to the Malay-medium national primary schools, 
these Tamil- and Chinese-medium national-type primary schools did not get full-aid from the 
government (Kok-Kheng Yeoh, 2006, p.226). So, part of their funding came from the Chinese 
or Indian community. This gives an idea of the value attached to these vernacular schools by 
the ethnic minorities. 
Before drawing conclusions about interethnic civic engagement in the education 
system of Malaysia, it is important to look at research on civic engagement in universities. 
One side note is that these surveys were conducted in the 2000s and in public universities, but 
in general they can give an idea about how civic engagement could take place in practice. The 
assumption that interethnic schools foster civic engagement between ethnic groups is not 
disputed. One research project indicated that students were reluctant is studying with and 
asking for help to students of other ethnicities. The researcher concluded, therefore, that social 
distance between ethnic groups remained because of a lack of understanding each other’s 
culture and because of prejudices (Kok-Kheng Yeoh, p.238).  
Yet, another researcher used questionnaires to analyze interethnic engagement in 
public universities. An important note is that 70.9% of the students that participated were 
Malay against 13.5% Chinese (Mustapha et al., p.40). The findings of this research were that 
students socialized and worked together and got a greater understanding of other cultures 
(p.42-43). The latter would support the assumption that students in an interethnic 
environment, when offered the opportunity to interact with the ethnic other, will engage with 
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others across ethnic lines. Finally, a third research used questionnaires and asked whether 
Malays had non-Malay friends and vice versa. This research took into account the primary 
and secondary education of the students who participated. Based on the answers of 379 
Malays and 381 Malaysian-Chinese students, the conclusion was that there was interethnic 
civic engagement between Malays and non-Malays (Tamam, 2009, p.60, 63).  
These three research projects by different scholars showed that interethnic civic 
engagement is possible in universities, but it is not easy. These surveys are a first attempt that 
should be considered when researching civic engagement in education systems, but 
generalizing from these findings is difficult. Furthermore, the answers provided by the 
students might be biased, therefore the social organization within universities is something 
that cannot be completely discussed in the thesis as more research on this topic is needed. 
However, what can be said is that an interethnic environment in public universities 
would be a positive step towards encouraging more interethnic civic engagement and can help 
in getting rid of dominant stereotypes of one another. To realize this, the discrimination of the 
Chinese in the education system should be ended because this is a crucial factor obstructing 
the level of interethnic civic engagement.  
Some scholars said that perhaps too much was expected from the education system 
(Singh and Mukherjee, p.99). In addition, there are still many obstacles for further interethnic 
engagement of students in the education system. The quota system was dominant for a long 
time before it was abolished in 2004. Primary and secondary schools continue to be ethnically 
segregated and the Malays are still in the majority in public universities, whereas private 
universities have been more appealing to other ethnic groups. So, perhaps there is progress in 
interethnic civic engagement in schools, but obstacles for interethnic civic engagement to 
create trust and national unity are daunting. For example, Chinese and Tamil national-type 
primary schools increased in number from 413,270 (Chinese) and 77,192 (Tamil) schools in 
1971 to 615,688 (Chinese) and 89,040 (Tamil) schools in 2001 (Kok-Kheng Yeoh, p.228). 
 
Conclusion 
There were great expectations from the NEP that it would transform the education system and 
create national unity through interethnic civic engagement. When looking at the policies 
during the NEP period, in secondary schools the creation of civic ties between Malays and 
non-Malays seemed most likely. Education was also considered to be a tool that would take 
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away the dissatisfaction among the Malays and improve their socio-economic position. Malay 
as the medium of instruction in secondary schools did not create ethnically mixed schools. 
Moreover, the NEP was considered by the non-Malays as a form of racial discrimination 
(Raman and Sua, p.130). In addition, national secondary schools were not sufficient in 
encouraging interethnic civic engagement as alternative and private schools were also 
allowed. Also, the NEP influenced the primary and tertiary education in a negative way as it 
made public universities primarily accessible for Malays and did not effectively deal with 
ethnic segregation in primary schools. Thus, it makes sense that the privatization of the 
education system aggravated the ethnic divide because non-Malays had fewer educational 
opportunities compared to the Malays. 
After having analyzed the changes in the education system, it is fair to say that 
education has not been the unifying force between the Malays and Chinese. The idea of 
creating unity, trust, and strong ethnic civic ties through the education system was possible, 
but the implementation of the policies was not appropriate and alternative schools in favor of 
Malays obstructed national unity as well. The NEP effect on higher education for the Chinese 
was more of a zero-sum game, as the increasing opportunities for the Malays were realized at 
the cost of the opportunities available to the Chinese. Overall, despite government efforts, 
interethnic civic engagement in the education system remained low because of discrimination 
and lack of effective (implementation of) education policies. 
However, it is too soon to derive any conclusions from this chapter on the NEP and 
the interethnic civic engagement in Malaysia. Another point is that Lijphart predicted that in a 
consensus democracy segregation in education would be a common feature.  Thus, before 
making final conclusions, it is essential to research whether the NEP encouraged interethnic 
civic engagement along the economic dimension and how the political system contributed to 
the ethnic peace in Malaysia. 
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Chapter 4: Interethnic Civic Engagement in the 
Business Sector 
 
In addition to the social dimension of interethnic civic engagement, it is important to draw 
attention to the economic dimension of interethnic civic engagement, as well, to research the 
ethnic relations in Malaysia. The economy was the main focus after the 1969 riots. The NEP 
had to improve the economic position of the Malays by educating them and granting them 
access to the business sector. The rationale behind it was that improving the economic 
position of the Malays and encouraging their personal development would take away some of 
their frustration and, concomitantly, reduce Malay-Chinese tensions. It is important to 
remember that the riots of 1967 and 1969 were anti-Chinese riots that broke out as a result of 
Malay frustration about the success of the Chinese Malaysians in the economy, while Malays 
were not involved in the economic development of the country.  
Before the NEP period, the economy was dominated by the Chinese, but after 1969 the 
Malays also started to play an increasing role in business. This chapter elaborates on the NEP, 
its achievements, and how it affected interethnic civic engagement. The NEP boosted the 
economy, created opportunities for Malays, and turned out to be a great advantage to the 
Chinese as well. The dimension also includes interethnic joint ventures. The analysis of joint 
ventures is a great asset to the thesis because only considering the role of traditional 
associations in this chapter, such as trade unions and chambers of commerce, is not sufficient 
for the case of Malaysia. The reason is that trade unions were restricted and this affected their 
functioning. Furthermore, for the research on the chambers of commerce and their role in 
maintaining ethnic peace, there were not many sources and data on these chambers.  
Because of the ineffectiveness of the unions and the strict government control, one 
might assume that this would complicate the research on interethnic civic engagement along 
the economic dimension. However, the interethnic joint ventures are useful and a well-
researched example of civic engagement and enable the researcher to analyze interethnic civic 
engagement in the business sector. Thus, traditional associations and organization will be 
looked at complemented by interethnic joint ventures.  
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Trade Unions 
In his research Varshney discovered that the role of integrated trade unions were important in 
cities that were experiencing disharmony. For example in Ahmedabad (India), riots took place 
in the period between 1941 and 1946, but the workers did not participate in ethnic violence 
because the trade unions were able to maintain peace among the ethnic groups in the working 
class and this kept them from participating in riots (2002, p.236). The first trade union in 
Malaysia, initiated by the Chinese Communist Party, emerged in the 1920s and was named 
the Nanyang Federation of Labour (NFL) which took an anti-colonial stance. Because of the 
recession in the 1930s, the NFL was brought under the Malayan General Labour Union that 
propagandized that it was a union for all ethnic groups (Rowley and Bhopal, p.98).  
In the mid-1940s, the Chinese-dominated Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions 
(PMFTU) grew rapidly. As a result of the communist insurgency of 1949, the British assisted 
in creating a moderate Malayan Trades Union Council (MTUC) in 1950, which existed of 
non-banned unions (p.100), to represent the Malaysian workers. The reason was that the 
Chinese labor unions were suppressed by the state after they engaged in a communist 
insurgency (Bhopal, 2001, p.77) 
In general, the union movements were ethnically divided. Also, they were encouraged 
not to take a political stance on issues or support any political (opposition) party, in exchange 
the government would sponsor the unions (Rowley and Bhopal, p.101). Even though, the 
MTUC, which was a federation of trade unions, called itself multi-ethnic, the Malays made up 
70% of the union leaders and workers (Bhopal, p.80). Today, the MTUC represents all major 
industries and has about 500,000 members and continues to call itself the labor centre of all 
workers in Malaysia (MTUC).  
The government suppressed unions that were opposing state policies and, 
consequently, deregistered these unions (Rowley and Bhopal, p.103). Even when the MTUC 
started to criticize some government policies in the late 1980s, the state further fragmented the 
union movement by supporting an alternative trade union centre, the Malaysian Labour 
Organisation (MLO) (p.104). Moreover, many smaller unions that were part of the MTUC 
were deregistered (Rowley and Bhopal, 2005, p.321). Eventually, the MLO disbanded in 1996 
because the MTUC was no longer opposing state policies. A striking aspect of the union 
movement was that, the chairmen and union leaders of the MTUC and MLO were often part 
of the UMNO (Malay) political party (2006, p. 106). These aspects indicate how much control 
and power the state exercised.  
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The legislative documents on trade unions are the Trade Unions Act (TUA) of 1959, 
which looks at trade union activities, and the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) of 1967, which 
looks at employer-union relations. However, the freedom of association is limited because the 
Malaysian government failed to ratify an essential International Labor Organization (ILO) 
convention. This was convention 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize Convention 1948. As a result, the government was able to disrupt the functioning of 
trade unions. In addition, the government benefitted from the great ethnic fragmentation of the 
trade unions, which they promoted, and restrained unions from becoming a platform for 
political opposition (p.109). Despite the restrictions on trade unions, the number of unions and 
members of trade unions increased between 1982 and 2002, from 272 to 609 and 529,046 to 
789,163 respectively (Ramasamy, 2008, p.3). However, this increase did not improve the 
functioning of the unions. An important note is that not all trade unions were represented by 
the MTUC. 
Thus, it can be said that interethnic civic engagement is low in trade unions because 
the trade unions in itself were constrained and inefficient. This remained unchanged even 
after 1969 and, therefore, trade unions never created a healthy platform for the Malaysians to 
influence state policies on the rights of workers. Trade unions are a great asset to interethnic 
relations, but for the case of Malaysia it is a less relevant formal organization to look at.  
 
Introducing the National Economic Policy 
Between 1957 and 1969, Malaysia was a well-to-do laissez-faire economy and focused on 
increasing growth. The economy was based on plantation, mining, and manufacturing. Since 
the Chinese dominated the business sector, where they owned 60% of the capital, the Chinese 
economic position was far better than that of the Malays. The ethnic violence of 1969 was 
linked to the Malay dissatisfaction and their economic position. The Chinese also came to 
believe that the economic disparities were an underlying condition to the eruption of ethnic 
violence (Horowitz, 1989, p.256). 
In the 1960s industrialization took place in Malaysia, which fostered both economic 
growth and income inequalities. The majority of the Chinese population was part of the 
working class and the majority of businessmen were Chinese. Between 1921 and 1971, the 
Chinese made up 60% of the urban population, whereas the Malays constituted about 22% of 
this population in 1957 (Khoo Boo, 2005, p.8). To give an indication of business in 1970, in 
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the construction sector the Chinese employed 89.6% of the workforce and in the wholesale 
and retail business this was 62% and 76% respectively (Heng, 1997, p.267-268). In addition, 
Chinese firms dominated the construction and commercial sectors. These percentages show 
that primarily the Chinese benefitted from the economic growth. The majority of the Malays 
were farmers, who blamed the Chinese dominance in the Malaysian economy for the 
underdevelopment of the Malays. In practice, though, other sectors of the economy were 
primarily dominated by foreign investors. For example, European companies controlled the 
rubber and tin businesses (Khoo Boo, p.11). 
 Nevertheless, the socio-economic disparity between the Malays and Chinese was a 
fact. To give an indication, in the 1960s, 74% of the poor households were Malay against 
percentages of 17 and 8 for the Chinese and Indians respectively (Ahmat, p.722). 
Furthermore, there was a high inequality in income distribution. When comparing the average 
monthly household incomes in 1970, the Bumiputras had an income of 276 Malaysian Ringgit 
(RM), whereas the Chinese were better off with 632 RM a month (Jomo, 2004, p.6). Even 
though the vast majority of the Malays had a much lower economic position than the majority 
of the Chinese, the Malays dominated politics and enjoyed stronger political power. This 
political power became apparent after the 1969 riots when the NEP was implemented. 
 In the NEP period of 1970 till 1990, a transformation in the business sector took place. 
The government established enterprises owned by the public sector and created joint ventures 
with the private sector. The main target was to end the socio-economic marginalization of the 
Malays. The United Malay National Organization party (UMNO), which led the government 
coalition, took up the role of protecting the Bumiputras and their special position as the 
indigenous people of Malaysia. The riots of 1969 proved that the Malays were frustrated and 
the UMNO, as the political protector of the Malay interests, had to step up to the plate and 
deal with these issues.  
There were some important economic targets included in the NEP, such as reducing 
poverty from 49.3 % in 1970 to 17% in 1990 (Geoffrey and Stafford, 1997, p.557). Another 
NEP target was to increase the Malay share of the corporate sector from 2.4% to 30%, non-
Malay share from 34% to 40%, and decrease the foreign share from 63.3% to 30% by 1990 
(Rahim, 2003, p.4). The idea was to reduce the foreign share of the corporate sector so that all 
ethnic groups in Malaysia could benefit from the economic development. The NEP 
formulated the objective to end income and wealth inequalities through economic growth, 
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which had to be realized by strategies that would encourage export-oriented industrialization 
and import-substitution in sectors like steel (Rowley and Bhopal, 2006, p.95).  
In addition, to increase the Malay share in business, the educational backwardness of 
the Malays had to be reduced through schooling, and at the same time the government 
assisted by offering financial help to encourage the development of a Malay private sector, 
called the Bumiputra Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC) (Chopra, 1974, p.445). 
The government formulated the need for meaningful employment, which implied training 
Malays in science and technology to clear out the job disparities between the Malays and 
Chinese and stimulate further economic development (Ahmat, p.724). To achieve the NEP 
target of 30%, positive discrimination of the Malays was deemed necessary by the 
government. However, to prevent agitation among the Chinese, who still dominated the 
business sector, the government actively tried to develop the economy rapidly. In this way, it 
was believed, each ethnic group would benefit (Chopra, p.446).  
 The NEP was characterized by state intervention in the economy, i.e. the visible hand. 
The public sector was increasingly involved in creating opportunities for the Malays in 
business and other occupations. Furthermore, the government invested heavily in Malay 
business, bought different companies to increase the Malay share in the corporate sector, and 
offered Malay entrepreneurs contracts, licensing, loans, subsidies, and training (Khoo Boo, 
p.16). Moreover, the state-controlled Pernas (National Corporation) bought and developed 
companies to, eventually, sell them to Bumiputras who were trained and able to run the 
business (Geoffrey and Stafford, p.560). In order to further develop and take over companies 
in the corporate sector, which were to be held in trust for the Malays, the PNB (National 
Equity Corporation) was established to assist the Pernas in its activities. Another institution 
involved in improving the Malay position in business, was the MARA
1
 which was occupied 
with education and took care of financing Malay entrepreneurs. These state-owned agencies 
worked as trustees of Malay economic interests. The number of these agencies increased from 
22 in 1960 to 1014 in 1985 (Khoo Boo, p.17). 
In addition, in 1975 the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) was passed. The ICA gave 
power to the ministry of trade and industry to decide on issues like ownership of companies, 
percentage of ethnic employment, and product pricing (p.16). The role of the public sector in 
the business dimension was encouraging more and more preferential treatment of the Malays, 
                                                          
1
 Translation of MARA is Indigeneous People’s Trust Council 
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which was perceived as discrimination by the Chinese. The Chinese capitalists were affected 
severely by the ICA requirement of creating 30% equity share for Bumiputra shareholders and 
making sure that 30% of the workforce was Malay in non-Malay manufacturing business with 
more than 250.000 RM in shareholders’ funds or employing more than 25 full-time staff 
(Heng, p.276).  The 30% equity share for the Malays was a condition to issue licenses for 
industrial activity (UNCTAD, 2003, p.137).  When exceeding the number of twenty-five 
employees, the non-Malay company had to obtain a manufacturing license (p.149). The 
Chinese failed to liberalize the ICA and this had two consequences. The first consequence 
was that Chinese companies tried to remain small in order not to exceed the 250.000 RM 
level, and secondly, Chinese entrepreneurs tried to engage more with Malay business partners 
(p.273). 
 
Interethnic Joint Ventures 
The manufacturing business sector experienced rapid growth in the NEP period because the 
government restructured the economy vigorously towards a more technological-oriented 
economy. The focus on the manufacturing industry was important to compete internationally 
and Malaysia managed to develop a comparative advantage for the electronic industry 
(Abidin and Loke, 2008, p.130). The number of public owned enterprises in the 
manufacturing sector was 5 in 1960 and increased in number to 315 in 1992 (Khoo Boo, 
p.17). In 1970, the Chinese owned about 30% of this sector, whereas foreign firms owned 
51% of the fixed assets in this sector (Heng, p.268). Following the 30:40:30 ratio (Malay; 
non-Malay; Foreign) of business ownership as proposed by the NEP, foreign ownership was 
reduced and brought under control of the public sector via the ICA and new legislation, where 
a Foreign Investment Committee had to give approval to foreign firms to buy properties in 
Malaysia (CPPS, 2006, p.7). Thus, due time, foreign ownership declined and the public sector 
increased their share in the manufacturing sector.  
Turning to the Chinese businessmen and their attitude towards the ICA, it was 
expected that they would be reluctant in creating a 30% equity share for the Malays. Despite 
the problems that the ICA created for the Chinese, it pushed the Chinese to deal creatively 
with the ICA. Thus, this creativity gave birth to the idea of Sino-Malay joint ventures. One 
side note is that the ICA was amended in 1985, where the ceiling of 250.000 was raised to 1 
million RM, and in 1990 it was changed to 2.5 million RM. These changes allowed small 
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Chinese business to transform into medium-sized companies (Heng, p.276). Yet, ways to 
avoid the ICA requirements was the main focus of Chinese entrepreneurs.  
The NEP encouraged interethnic joint ventures by setting a target of 30% ownership, 
primarily, to guarantee the role of Malays in the business sectors. Additionally, interethnic 
joint ventures were considered important because it was believed that in this way the Malays 
could learn entrepreneurial skills from the Chinese (Whah, 2010, p.4). However, Chinese 
companies were facing competition from Malay firms in sectors like construction and retail 
trade, which the Chinese used to dominate. Also, the political arena favored the adoption of 
radical policies in favor of the Malays; the Chinese had little say in this.  
The Chinese realized they had to take action to deal with the rapid changes, and this 
led to the interethnic joint venture, often called the “Ali Baba arrangement”. This arrangement 
was discovered as a solution for the Chinese to get access to trade protection, government 
projects, and new business opportunities, which were only available to Malay entrepreneurs, 
through sleeping Malay partners (Ritchie, 2005, p.748). The Chinese partners would run the 
business with their capital and knowledge, whereas the Malay partner would guarantee the 
Chinese entrepreneur access to government licenses and contracts (Bajuri and Chakravarty, 
p.6). In exchange, the Malay partner got generous fees for his help (Heng, p.276). The Ali 
Baba joint venture was mainly a way for the Chinese to benefit from the protection and 
benefits guaranteed by the public sector. It is not easy, though, to judge whether an interethnic 
joint venture is an Ali Baba arrangement or a genuine interethnic partnership. Either way, it is 
likely that interethnic communication took place in interethnic joint ventures, which is an 
important aspect of interethnic civic engagement. Before a business partnership could be 
established, either the Chinese or the Malay partner had to approach the other and there had to 
be a willingness to cooperate. 
A study by the Centre for Public Policy Studies (CPPS) (2006, p.17) showed that by 
1998,  18 of the 757 companies, listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), had 
Malay and non-Malay owners, which indicated that these were interethnic joint ventures. The 
majority of the interethnically-owned firms started cooperating across ethnic boundaries in the 
1980s. The close interethnic cooperation in at least 18 large firms indicates that interethnic 
civic ties were improving in the business sector as it broke the old traditions to do business 
with entrepreneurs from the same ethnic group. The latter was characteristic, predominantly, 
for the Chinese businessmen.  
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However, relying on the KLSE listed firms was criticized by Bajuri and Chakravarty 
(p.16) because only 13.6% of companies were listed, and they argued that the CPPS 
underestimated the difficulty of creating a well-functioning interethnic joint venture. Another 
issue, when looking at interethnic joint ventures, is that the focus is on large firms, and not on 
smaller non-Malay firms which suffered from the tough competition. There are hundreds of 
Small-Medium-Enterprises that could be characterized as interethnic joint ventures, but these 
are not listed on the KLSE and it is difficult to do research on all these companies. Despite the 
increasing competition for the Chinese, in the academic literature there seems to be a 
consensus that Chinese business advanced during the NEP period.  
Because of the restrictions when considering only KLSE listed companies, it is 
important to look at other research work, such as conducted by Chin Yee Whah. Whah 
researched 111 interethnic small-medium companies listed at the Companies Commission of 
Malaysia (CCM) of which 71 were conducting business in the construction and 
manufacturing sectors. More than half of the 111 companies were started and owned by the 
Chinese partner, whereas 34 companies started as an interethnic joint venture (p.7). The 
scholar argued that despite the amendments in the ICA, the number of interethnic joint 
ventures continuously increased in the 1980s and 1990s (p.8-9).  
In general, in each joint venture, Chinese and Malay partners had their own reasons to 
cooperate in such a partnership. Often the Chinese rationale was to gain access to government 
protection and licenses. For the Malays it was to get acquainted with the successful Chinese 
way of doing business, so learning skills and know-how, but also using experienced Chinese 
partners to run a good business. However, the focus should be on the result of these 
partnerships because they created trust and communication.  
Communication and friendly relations between ethnic groups could be an essential 
factor during times of ethnic tensions. Even though ethnic violence might seem to be a 
rational choice for some members of the society, communication lines and the level of trust in 
the business sector could restrain violence. The absence of feelings of mistrust towards the 
ethnic other among businessmen, as a result of the business relations between the Chinese and 
Malays, and their awareness that they would experience great losses if these ethnic tensions 
and violence would spill over to the business sector, could prevent the outbreak or spread of 
violence. Different sectors and members of the society would have different opinions about 
ethnic violence, and thus also about the costs and benefits of violence, which influences their 
choice of engaging in violence. 
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In addition, absolutely central in these business partnerships was trust (p.16) because 
under the Ali Baba arrangement both partners had equal stakes at risk. Furthermore, the 
greater ethnic variety in workforce and entrepreneurs develops an economic symbiosis, as 
Varshney calls it, when ethnic groups need each other for business (2002, p.178). By 1990, 
the Malay employment in agriculture fell to approximately 36%, while the Malay 
employment in the public and private sector rose to 53% (Rowley and Bhopal, p.96). The 
growing interethnic workforce and interethnic business relations illustrates Varshney’s 
argument that when people get the opportunity to engage with each other, it improves their 
relations, and creates interethnic trust.  
Businessmen, whether Malay or non-Malay, engaged with each other for new business 
opportunities to make profits (p.27). Both the Malay and Chinese partners were important in a 
partnership because they made different contributions to the company and, hence, were both 
significant assets to a joint venture. Thus, there was an economic symbiosis. As a result of the 
NEP and the ICA, the business sector was no longer a playfield exclusively for the Chinese. 
Because of the greater involvement of Malays in business, Malays became more than a silent 
partner. Due time, Malays enjoyed proper education and were trained for the business sector, 
which resulted in a more active Malay role in interethnic joint ventures and the business 
sector in general. Malays and non-Malays were adapting to the changes in the business sector. 
 
NEP Achievements 
Despite the radical changes adopted under the NEP period, the only political party that 
opposed to the NEP was the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PMIP). The PMIP’s perspective 
was that the NEP did not do enough for the Malays. All the other political parties accepted the 
radical policies that gave preferential treatment to the Malays because it was perceived as an 
important step to prevent the outbreak of new riots. The NEP transformed the business sector 
and the economy radically. One of the outcomes was the increase in interethnic joint ventures, 
which was a vital development for interethnic civic engagement in Malaysia. However, it is 
important to shed light on other outcomes of the NEP as well to analyze whether it 
contributed to improving interethnic civic ties. 
 To begin with the 30:40:30 business ownership ratio, by 1990 the Malay share was 
about 18% and remained this way in the 1990s and 2000s, whereas the Chinese share was 
45% (CPPS, p.4). However, when looking at the top ten companies in Malaysia, seven of 
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them were owned by the government, called government linked companies (GLCs) (p.10). 
Thus, one could argue that the Malay share even exceeded the 30% as the GLCs share was 
attributable to the Malays (Idem). The number of public enterprises increased from 109 in 
1970 to 1149 in 1992 (Khoo Boo, p.17). The GLCs expanded their share of ownership by the 
government’s successful attempts to gain control over big companies that were owned by 
foreigners and non-Malays (CPPS, p.14). Despite this discussion, the official statistics of the 
government indicated that the 30:40:30 ratio was not attained. However, it should be clear 
that increasing the Malay share to 18% was quite an achievement and should not be 
underestimated. 
 Turning to the NEP objectives to reduce poverty and create a Malay business 
community, it can be said that these goals were achieved by 1990. In Malaysia the poverty 
rate was 49.3% in 1970, which was reduced to 16.5% by 1990 and 5% by 2002 (Jomo, 
p.3).The poverty reduction was the result of the rapid economic growth in which the 
government encouraged the development of especially the manufacturing sector. 
Consequently, the incomes per month on average in Malaysia changed concomitantly from 
423 RM a month in 1970 to 1167 RM in 1990 (p.6). In addition, when looking at the ethnic 
groups of the Malays and Chinese individually, the improvement in income per month was 
940 RM and 1631 RM respectively in 1990 (Idem).  Furthermore, the NEP was successful in 
ending the identification of ethnicity with economic function. 
 It is clear that the NEP targets could only be achieved by economic growth and for the 
speed of this growth, the interventionist role of the government was indispensable. Often non-
Malays felt threatened by the radical economic policies and intervention of the government 
(Jomo, p.2). Also, the Chinese faced discrimination and greater competition in different 
business sectors. However, the Chinese had little choice but to accept the NEP, in particular 
after the 1969 riots, and they were assured that the UMNO-led-government would protect the 
Chinese interests as well (Heng, p.266).  
In general, the business sector changed as more and different actors started to play a 
significant role. In the 1960s the Chinese had great leverage over the state because of their 
dominant economic position (Jesudason, 1997, p.121). Then, in the 1970s, the Malays 
enjoyed preferential treatment and the government was busy in creating the BCIC.  Only after 
the implementation of the ICA did the NEP significantly affect the Chinese interests (Heng, 
p.268). In the meantime, Chinese political parties and companies tried to find ways to 
strengthen the economic position of the Chinese by giving support to Chinese companies to 
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compete with the GLCs (p.273). However, in the 1980s the government realized that the 
Malays had to learn business skills from the Chinese and, as a result, the number of 
interethnic joint ventures increased. On the whole, though, all ethnic groups in Malaysia 
profited from the economic growth. 
In light of the economic growth, there were increasing opportunities for the Malays 
and Chinese to engage with each other which smoothened interethnic cooperation. Yet, some 
scholars argue that low economic development fosters rebellion, whereas economic growth 
leads to ethnic peace because then the opportunity costs for joining rebellion are higher 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). The opportunities created by the economic development and 
growth in Malaysia definitely contributed to facilitating communication and improving the 
level of trust between the Malays and Chinese after the 1969 riots. Economic growth 
functioned as a medium to pull the Malays and Chinese to each other in the business 
dimension.  
However, economic development is not the central factor that explains ethnic peace. 
An example is the recession in the mid-1980s in Malaysia. The economic backslide did not 
result into violent riots and this indicates that there were other factors at play, besides 
economic development, that influenced the sustainability of peace in Malaysia. One 
explanation, as put forward by Jesudason (p.139), is that because the business sector became 
more interethnic by the 1980s, the Malays could no longer blame the Chinese dominance for 
their economic position and problems. 
Another point is that the recession also revealed a negative side of the NEP. The 
recession of 1985-1986 was the result of worsening economic conditions globally, which led 
to lower prices for Malaysia’s primary commodities that the export-oriented country used to 
finance the NEP goals with. The recession showed that the public sector was oversized and 
the economy was over-regulated (Lee, p.31-32). By 1985, the public investments were higher 
than the private investments in the economy (Heng, p.282). The public owned enterprises 
were also not working efficiently, this led to an extremely fast growing deficit in the public 
sector that reached an amount of 15.2 billion RM in 1982 (Khoo Boo, p.27). Consequently, 
the government had to find alternative ways to boost the economy and, thus, budget cuts were 
inevitable.  
In addition the ICA was amended which made it easier for the Chinese and foreigners 
to do business in Malaysia without losing a great part of their ownership (Heng, p.286). 
Previous to these amendments, many foreign firms had to provide for 51% Malaysian (often 
44 
 
Malay) equity participation (Horowitz, 1989, 268).  The government realized that their 
dominant role in the economy, in itself, could no longer foster economic growth. There was a 
need for deregulation in Malaysia to remain competitive and the government introduced a 
privatization policy in 1983. Privatization had to relieve the government from their financial 
debts, but at the same time the Malaysian interests had to be protected. This was resolved by 
encouraging private entrepreneurship and signing over public enterprises to Malay 
entrepreneurs (Rasiah and Shari, p.73). Privatization attracted domestic and foreign investors 
as they wanted to profit from the economic development and new projects in Malaysia 
(Beeson, 2009, p.59). 
 The measures taken in the 1980s to deal with the debts and recession were 
privatization, economic liberalization, and tax reforms which proved to be essential to boost 
the economy (Lee, p.32). The 1980s were an important lesson for the government that 
economic growth and the role of the public sector in this, should not be taken for granted. An 
important step taken in 1988 was the establishment of the National Economic Consultative 
Council (NECC). The NECC consisted of 150 members with different ethnicities to discuss 
an economic replacement of the NEP after its termination in 1990. The NECC report 
emphasized issues like poverty eradication and economic development, but national unity and 
the improvement of ethnic relations were set as a priority (Heng, p.288).  
The recommendations of the NECC were considered when the National Development 
Policy (NDP) was accepted in 1991 to replace the NEP. The economic liberalization and 
improved state-business relationships, which continued in the 1990s, were advantageous to 
Malay and Chinese entrepreneurs. The state support to the Malays was replaced by market 
incentives because the opinion was that the Malays were ready to do business by themselves 
(SarDesai, 2010, p.297). Even after the financial crisis of 1997-1998, Malaysia recovered 
quickly and experienced economic growth in the post-crisis period. 
 
Chambers of Commerce  
In addition to the trade unions, chambers of commerce were also part of the freedom of 
association. What makes the focus on trade unions and chambers of commerce more 
important is that the Chinese took the initiative to develop these organizations. In the 1950s 
and 1960s they enjoyed great collective power (Jesudason, p.122). The Chinese established 
Chinese chambers of commerce and were involved in Chinese school committees to protect 
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their business networks and exercise economic power. Because the business and related 
associations were in Chinese hands, it created a barrier for the Malay middle class to enter 
business networks (p.123).  
However, this dominance changed during the NEP period. The interventionist policies 
of the government also fragmented the collective power of the Chinese, as there were 
diverting opinions about Chinese political parties. There were two leading Chinese political 
parties, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Gerakan. In the beginning, the 
MCA was widely supported, but due time the Chinese associations either distanced 
themselves from the MCA and politics, or joined the Gerakan (p.125). Another result was that 
the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia (ACCCIM) acted 
alone to represent Chinese business and criticized the government on their interventionism.   
Many attempts were made by the MCA, in the 1970s, to restore the collective power 
by supporting Chinese businesses. This support was not successful and, instead, the Chinese 
entrepreneurs were looking for alternative ways to adapt to the NEP period. Many Chinese 
found ways to benefit from the economy during the NEP period. Furthermore, in the late 
1980s, the ACCCIM was represented in councils to discuss the future after the NEP. The 
liberalization and privatization in the economy in the 1980s and 1990s were enthusiastically 
welcomed by the Chinese. Clearly, the Chinese entrepreneurs, who were creative enough to 
find ways to take advantage of the economic development, benefitted from the economy 
during and after the NEP period. The ACCCIM encouraged cooperation between the Chinese 
and Malays even after economic liberalization because Malays had connections and capital, 
whereas the Chinese had the expertise (p.135). 
However, when the ICA was accepted, the ACCCIM was concerned about the impact 
on Chinese business. Thus, the ACCCIM cooperated with the Malaysian International 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MICCI) to liberalize the ICA (Heng, p.273). 
Multinational corporations were represented by the MICCI.  Eventually, the ICA was 
amended. This example shows that there was room for negotiations and cooperation among 
different chambers of commerce. The ACCCIM is based on a national level and, today, 
represents 28000 Malaysian Chinese companies and the Chinese business community in 
general (ACCCIM). In business there is a cooperation framework which is needed to protect 
the economic interests of Malay, non-Malay, and foreign companies.  
The most evident example is that the ACCCIM works closely with the National 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia (NCCIM). The latter represents, next to the 
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ACCCIM and the MICCI, also the Malay Chamber of Commerce Malaysia (MCCM), 
Malaysian Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (MAICCI), and Federation of 
Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM). Through the NCCIM, these five associations cooperate to 
take a stance on state policies. However, at the same time the ethnic oriented chambers also 
aim to protect the interests of either the Malays, Indians, or Chinese. 
 
Conclusion 
The NEP consisted of some policies, like the ICA, that initially made business for the Chinese 
difficult. However, the amendments in the ICA and the economic development were 
beneficial to all Malaysian ethnic groups. In this sense, the NEP was indeed aimed at 
improving the society as a whole. On the other hand, there are some scholars who argue that, 
as a result of the NEP, interethnic relations worsened (Jomo, p.492). However, the analysis in 
this chapter showed that, especially, through joint ventures the Malays and Chinese engaged 
with each other which positively influenced their ethnic relations. Also, the economic sector 
was changed dramatically, which made cooperation and business between Chinese and 
Malays inevitable. 
 The two recessions in the eighties and nineties, could have functioned as sparks and 
lead to ethnic violence. Yet, there was no violence as a result of these economic declines. 
Even though the freedom of association was restricted in Malaysia, there was cooperation 
among national and ethnic chambers of commerce. It seems likely that an economic 
symbiosis and interethnic civic engagement prevented the outbreak of violence when the 
economy was performing badly. Table 4.1 summarizes the change in the level of ethnic 
segregation along the economic dimension by distinguishing between trade unions, joint 
ventures, and chambers of commerce. The conclusion is that overall ethnic segregation 
decreased, which also implies that interethnic civic engagement increased along the economic 
dimension.  
 
Table 4.1 Change in ethnic segregation 
 Ethnic segregation 
Trade Unions unchanged 
Joint Ventures decreased 
Chambers of Commerce decreased slightly 
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Interethnic civic engagement and ethnic peace 
Before drawing conclusions about the causal relationship between interethnic civic 
engagement and ethnic peace, some attention should be paid to the presence and absence of 
ethnic violence in Malaysia. It is clear that in 1967 and 1969 Malaysia faced ethnic violence 
where the Chinese were attacked by Malays. However, between 1969 and 2012, Malaysia 
never experienced the same level and scale of brutal ethnic violence again. The aim of this 
thesis is to explain the ethnic peace in Malaysia, but it is important to remember that 
Varshney argued that his theory of civic engagement would predict ethnic violence in 
Malaysia because of the level of ethnic segregation in the country. From the chapters on the 
social and economic dimensions of interethnic civic engagement it can be derived that 
Varshney’s conclusion, that Malaysia is completely ethnically segregated, is not correct. The 
reason is that the analysis in these dimensions of interethnic civic engagement showed that in 
some formal organizations interethnic civic engagement took place. However, at the same 
time, interethnic ties did not develop in all the formal organizations which were discussed in 
the two chapters of interethnic civic engagement. So, this means that there are other factors, 
besides interethnic civic engagement, that influenced the ethnic peace in Malaysia. 
The MAR did some research on Malaysia and its ethnic minorities. Their main 
conclusion was that even though the Chinese were discriminated against as a result of the 
NEP, it was not likely that the Chinese would use violence against the Malays (2009). This 
could be explained by the fact that the Chinese were politically fragmented, but also that the 
government did not suppress them actively. Thus, one of the factors that influenced ethnic 
peace in Malaysia could be that dissatisfied ethnic minorities, such as the Chinese, were 
fragmented and therefore hesitant in provoking or using violence against other ethnic groups.  
However, despite fragmentation within and between groups, Malaysia was able to 
maintain peace and to effectively rule the country. Concerning the violence against the 
Chinese in 1969, this also had to do with the role of political elites who used stereotypes and 
historical narratives as a tool to aggravate the ethnic divide in 1969. However, since these 
riots the Malaysian government ruled the country peacefully and the Malays did not use 
ethnic violence against the Chinese. To understand the increase in Malay tolerance and 
peaceful behavior, it is important to look at the political level as the Malays exercised greater 
political power on that level. What happened at the political level is that political parties and 
elites, with different ethnicities, realized that ethnic violence was harming national interests 
and they had to cooperate not only to deal with each other’s interests, but also to build a 
48 
 
stronger nation. Therefore, to understand the absence of ethnic violence in Malaysia and how 
this cooperation took place, the political system and political elites of Malaysia are key 
aspects to look at to understand the ethnic peace since 1969. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
Chapter 5: Malaysia’s Consensus Democracy 
 
According to Varshney, political parties, especially when organized along ethnic lines, use 
polarizing strategies to increase the political support from their ethnic group. For a political 
party, the protection of the interests of that specific ethnic group are central in propaganda and 
election campaigns to win hearts and minds.  
To explain the ethnic peace in Malaysia, the focus will be on features of the consensus 
democracy to understand how politics can influence ethnic peace by creating political 
stability. Furthermore, the chapter elaborates on the political and electoral systems of 
Malaysia and the national election of 1969 to understand what happened that enraged the 
Malays. This chapter will first explain the semi-democratic political system of Malaysia and 
pay attention to the restrictions on political freedoms. Then, the theory of consociationalism 
will be discussed and applied to the case of Malaysia.  
The consensus democracy brought the political elites together and taught them to 
bargain and compromise, but Lijphart cannot really explain interethnic civic engagement in 
the society. He has a different understanding of improving interethnic relations. His 
assumption is that ethnic relations in a society will improve as a result of the cooperation 
among political elites. However, to understand the ethnic peace in Malaysia, one has to go 
beyond the idea that cooperation between political elites will promote harmony on the mass 
levels. Therefore, the focus on political systems, elites, and multiethnic coalitions in this 
chapter, together with the focus on interethnic civic engagement in formal organizations are 
important to explain the ethnic peace in Malaysia since 1969. 
Also, the chapter will show the effectiveness of the power-sharing arrangement in 
Malaysia, and how the multiethnic coalition ruled for so many years. The restrictions on 
political freedoms, authoritarian aspects of the political system, and positive discrimination 
created some problems to conduct the research. Yet, this also shows that Malaysia is a deviant 
case.  
 
 
Political System in a Nutshell  
Malaysia became an independent democratic country in 1957. The prime minister and the 
cabinet together have the executive power. However, as a result of the communist insurgency 
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from 1948 till 1960, there were some restrictions on political freedom. For example, the 
Internal Security Act (ISA) was introduced which allowed preventive detention. Furthermore, 
the Malays were well represented in the political arena as the UMNO was the greatest 
political party and the Malays dominated the bureaucracy, police, and judiciary (Crouch, 
1996, p.29).  
The political system had both democratic and authoritarian characteristics. There were 
elections, opposition parties, social organizations, but at the same time the electoral system 
was gerrymandered to make sure that a government majority in the national parliament would 
be achieved (p.30). In addition, a Sedition Act was introduced in 1948 and amended after 
1969. It prohibited the discussion of sensitive issues in public debates, the press was being 
controlled, and neither trade unions nor students could be part of political parties (pp.85, 90, 
93). For students this was formulated under the University Colleges Act of 1971 (Freedom 
House). 
Moreover, the political parties in Malaysia were divided based on ethnicity. This was 
an obstacle, especially, for the opposition parties that continued to rely on a certain ethnic 
group. In contrast, the Alliance-led government consisted of different political parties, such as 
the UMNO, the MCA and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), which was later called the 
National Front (NF). The Alliance emerged in 1952 when these three parties joined hands to 
fight for independence (Beeson, 2009, p.33). The cooperation between Malay, Chinese, and 
Indian political parties in the NF took place because the UMNO wanted to form at least a two-
thirds majority to be able to make changes in the constitution, whereas the Chinese and Indian 
parties cooperated to have a say in politics by partnering with the bigger UMNO (p.59).  
Also, Malaysia’s first-past-the-post system, at times, was advantageous to the NF to 
reach a majority (Brown, 2005, p.5). So, the elections were open, but the restrictions and 
benefits for the leading government made it quite difficult for the opposition to defeat the NF 
coalition. Another point is that the organization of parties along ethnic lines did not lead to the 
problem of credible commitments for the NF. The reason is that the political parties in the NF 
needed each other to govern. This interdependency was based on credible commitments 
which were the key to the cooperation in the NF. 
The political system in Malaysia is a semi-democracy. The restrictions on political 
freedoms were accepted because of the communist insurgency and 1969 experience in order 
to maintain peace. Furthermore, nobody could come up with an alternative system to preserve 
ethnic harmony and peace in the society (Case, 1993, p.188). The electoral system was biased 
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in favor of the UMNO-led government and made it harder for the opposition to win (all) seats 
in a district. The NF enjoyed great support, and the restrictions on political freedom made it 
easier for the sitting government to win seats in the different districts and, thus, win the 
elections (Crouch, p.56). The NF won ten of the eleven elections with a two-thirds majority, 
except for the elections of 1969, and in 2008 the NF lost its two-thirds majority in the lower 
house of Parliament for the first time since 1969 (Freedom House, 2011). 
 
Consociational Democracy 
Arend Lijphart identified Malaysia as a consensus democracy. Some policies are 
characteristic for consociationalism, such as including minorities in a grand coalition, cultural 
autonomy for minorities (Varshney, 2004, p.151), and group autonomy to run the internal 
affairs of the ethnic group such as education (Lijphart, 2004, p.97). These policies were 
present in Malaysia. One side note on education is that this policy only applied to primary 
education and the MCA had a say in education policies (Horowitz, 1989, p.258-259).  
The NF ruled Malaysia since independence and this coalition ensured that the 
minorities were represented and protected the Malay, Indian, and Chinese interests to prevent 
the violent escalation of ethnic tensions. Because of the interethnic coalition, the Indians and 
Chinese Malaysians were granted seats in a number of districts which led to proportional 
representation of the ethnic groups. This consensus democracy in Malaysia contributed to 
creating ethnic peace in the fragmented society (Lijphart, 1996, p.266).  
 The logic behind a consociational democracy is clear, i.e. to create a government with 
cooperating political elites to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a 
stable democracy (Lijphart, 1969, p.216). However, some aspects of a consociational 
democracy do not seem to be fully present in Malaysia. To name the most important aspect, 
Malaysia is a semi-democracy. Lijphart acknowledged that a consociational democracy might 
not be as democratic as other democracies are (1969, p.214). Despite this issue, it can be said 
that the power-sharing arrangement in Malaysia was present and definitely fostered 
interethnic cooperation among the political elites.  
In addition, Varshney acknowledged that an interethnic coalition could indeed create 
ethnic peace, but this would be the result of interethnic civic engagement which would make 
polarizing strategies of ethnically oriented political parties, like the BJP in India, ineffective 
and allow room and support for multiethnic parties or coalitions, like the Congress Party 
52 
 
(2002, p.200). In Malaysia, however, the interethnic coalition already existed before 1969 and 
continued after the 1969 riots. In addition, political restrictions favored the NF. In Malaysia’s 
case interethnic civic engagement only flourished during the NEP period, i.e. after 1969, and 
did not lead to the grand coalition in the first place. 
However, despite the existence of the NF, the UMNO continued to be the party for the 
Malays, the MCA for the Chinese, and the MIC for the Indians (Haque, 2003, p.246). There 
was no move towards ethnic assimilation because on the political level, the parties did their 
level best to protect the interests of the ethnic groups which they represented (p.256). On this 
political platform, the Malay interests had the overhand because of fears that their 
dissatisfaction would increase which could lead to new violence. According to Harold 
Crouch, in a democracy ethnic politicians cannot avoid to take a stance on ethnic issues 
(Crouch, p.152). Yet, it could be argued that the NF used the argument of interethnic 
differences to stay in power (Sundaram, p.39). Race consciousness and the fear for the 
Chinese, who dominated the business, was used as a tool by the UMNO to gain support 
among the Malays and offset rival political parties representing the same ethnic group 
(Brennan, 1982, p.200). 
In addition, the power-sharing arrangement contributed to the prevention of ethnic 
rebellion in Malaysia, which is the minimum expectation one can have from this arrangement 
(Norris, p.25). Despite the authoritarian aspects of the system, the political elites were pulled 
together to cooperate across ethnic lines with the objective of preventing the outbreak of 
ethnic violence. The characteristics of consociationalism created stability and contributed in 
preventing violence, therefore the focus on the consensus democracy is important in the 
analysis to understand the ethnic peace of Malaysia.   
 
The 1969 Riots 
The riots in Penang were a manifestation of tensions between ethnic groups. This became 
visible again during the riots on May 13,
 
1969 which were connected to the national election 
in West-Malaysia on the 10
th
 of May. The federation of Malaysia exists of West-Malaysia and 
East-Malaysia, which in turn consist of different districts. There were two states in East-
Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak, only by 1984 a third state was created. Before 1969, Malaysia 
was segregated along ethnic lines in the social and economic dimensions of interethnic civic 
engagement. Only in the dimension of political cooperation different ethnic political parties 
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were cooperating through the Alliance-led government. However, the multiethnic coalition 
that ruled the country since 1957 could not prevent ethnic violence from erupting.  
 The day after the election, there was a widespread belief that the Alliance lost the 
elections and that the political system was in a crisis (Von Vorys, 1975, p.308). After 
independence, the Alliance took up the responsibility of safeguarding the social contract of 
1957 (p.134). It is a fact that many Malays turned their back to the UMNO because they felt 
that the Alliance was not living up to the social contract in which the development of the 
Malays was one of the key aspects. Instead, the Malays thought that the coalition was too fair 
to the Chinese and, therefore, they voted for the PMIP, UMNO’s competitor, in 1969 (p.308-
309). The PMIP argued that the social contract was in favor of the non-Malays and that the 
UMNO was not protecting the Malay interests. There were also Chinese opposition parties, 
like the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), Gerakan, and Democratic Action Party (DAP). The 
opposition parties made the elections more challenging and because many Chinese were 
voting against the MCA, the Alliance was becoming more dependent on the Malay supporters 
(Von Vorys, 160-161). 
 The outcome of the elections indicated that the Chinese opposition won an increasing 
number of seats, something the Alliance nor the PMIP wished for. For the Chinese opposition 
parties this was a great victory in itself and they went out on the streets to celebrate. Malays 
were not part of the celebrations and demonstrations, which sharpened the Malay versus non-
Malay identities. The UMNO was concerned about the outcomes and uncertain about the 
Alliance’s future. Therefore, on May 13, a UMNO demonstration was organized. Malays 
joined the demonstration to either show support to the UMNO, or show the solidarity of the 
Malays (Von Vorys, p.323). More Malays gathered in Kuala Lumpur and their frustration was 
fed by rumors about an uncertain future for the Malays. It seems that the frustration and 
uncertainties, following the elections, created a spark that led to Malays attacking the 
Chinese, and this resulted in ethnic violence. 
 In order to get a better understanding of the elections, it is important to mention that 
Malaysia has a Senate and a House of Representatives. For the latter, there were 144 seats 
available in 1969, divided over West Malaysia (104 seats), Sabah (16 seats) and Sarawak (24 
seats). The election results showed that in West-Malaysia the Alliance (UMNO+MCA+MIC) 
won 66 seats, PMIP 12 seats, PPP 4 seats, Gerakan 8 seats, the DAP 13 seats, and one seat to 
be decided (Ratnam and Milne, 1970, p.204). The number of seats of the Alliance decreased 
from 89 in 1964 to 66 (Gagliano, 1970, p.14). At the national level the Alliance still had a 
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majority, but of the eleven states in West-Malaysia the future of the Alliance government on 
state level was uncertain in Penang, Perak, and Selangor (Crouch, p.23). 
The Alliance was a coalition but participated in the elections as one party with one 
candidate list for the Malaysians to cast their vote on, while the election campaigns were 
directed at specific ethnic groups by the UMNO, MCA, and MIC to make the people vote for 
the Alliance (Rudner, 1970, p.2). The Alliance list consisted of 104 candidates, 68 from 
UMNO, 33 from MCA, and only 3 from the MIC, reflecting the voter appeal of the Alliance 
(p.5). It turned out that the UMNO performed badly in states that were almost purely Malay, 
and thus there were not enough Chinese and Indian voters to compensate for the Malay 
support for the PMIP, whereas the MCA performed badly in states that were almost purely 
Chinese where there were not enough Malay votes to compensate for the Chinese support for 
the DAP and Gerakan (Chopra, p.442). 
 The elections in Sabah and Sarawak were planned on May 25 and June 7 1969 
respectively. Because of the poor election results in West-Malaysia, the elections scheduled 
for Sabah and Sarawak did not seem promising for the Alliance and its political leadership. 
This insecurity was felt by the Malays, who were concerned about their political position and 
socio-economic development, which led to ethnic violence (Horowitz, 1989, p.255). The 
elections in East-Malaysia did not take place as the Parliament was suspended for 21 months 
as a result of the riots in May 1969 (p.256). 
From this episode, it can be derived that, especially, the ethnic opposition parties 
contributed to polarizing ethnic groups further in an environment where interethnic civic 
engagement was absent. This challenged the multiethnic power-sharing arrangement in 
Malaysia. The Alliance always attempted to reach a compromise on ethnic issues and at the 
same time gain support from their respective communities. However, in 1969 the Alliance 
failed to protect ethnic harmony, but this was the result of democracy, where citizens 
expressed their dissatisfactions through elections. The violent ethnic conflict of 1969 was an 
eye-opener for the political elites and the Malaysian people that the absence of national unity 
and prejudices about the ethnic other were serious problems and had to be dealt with. The 
lesson was that, next to cooperation between political elites, interethnic civic engagement was 
necessary to create and maintain ethnic peace in a deeply fragmented Malaysia.  
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Post-1969 
The suspension of the Parliament left the Chinese opposition parties in no position to 
negotiate or exercise political power. Because of the emergency rule after the riots, the 
election process of 1969 was never completed. The National Operations Council (NOC), led 
by the deputy prime minister Tun Abdul Razak, took power between 1969 and 1971. During 
this emergency rule, the NEP was also formulated. A young group of leaders within the 
UMNO gained control and were aimed at restoring the Malay political power, increasing 
support for the UMNO, and strengthening Malay economic power (Jesudason, p.124). 
However, the MCA was reluctant in participating in the emergency cabinet, led by the 
Malay elite and MCA and MIC leaders. The reason was that they did not perform well during 
the elections of 1969. The MCA lost seats to the Chinese opposition, that is 14 of its 27 seats 
in Parliament (Chopra, p.442) to the DAP and Gerakan. The MCA knew that it had become 
less effective in defending the non-Malay interests. As a result of pressure from the Chinese 
community (Von Vorys, p.370-371), the MCA compromised and decided to support the 
emergency cabinet by allowing the appointment of three MCA politicians ministers, but 
without a portfolio. 
In 1971, the Alliance was replaced by the National Front, and broadened by inviting 
the Gerakan, PPP, PMIP, and some smaller parties to become part of the NF. In 1974, just 
before the elections, the new NF was registered as a confederation of parties. For the 
opposition parties it was advantageous to join hands with the NF because after the 1969 riots, 
opposition parties lost more power and influence. The NF would also benefit as the strong 
opposition parties would their issues with UMNO, MCA, and MIC privately. Furthermore, 
the new NF gave the control over the government back to the largest political party, the 
UMNO (Crouch, p.33). As a result, the National Front fared well, even though the PMIP was 
expelled from the NF in 1977. The 1974 elections were used to win back the confidence of 
the people. The NF again portrayed itself as a multiethnic cooperation to deal with ethnic 
tensions, and thus ethnic violence became a trump card to win the support of the Malaysian 
voters.  
In addition, in 1999 NF won 148 of 193 parliamentary seats and in 2004, 198 of 219 
parliamentary seats (Khoo Boo, p.40). Eventually, the ruling NF was a coalition of 13 parties, 
either with an ethnic or regional base. For the first time after 1969, the NF lost its two-thirds 
majority in 2008, and won only 140 parliamentary seats out a total of 222. In five of the 
thirteen Malaysian states, the opposition coalition, called the People’s Alliance, governed 
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(Beeson, p.88). The DAP, PMIP, and the in 2003 newly formed party, the People’s Justice 
Party (PKR), fared well, with 28, 22, and 31 seats won respectively (Pandian, 2010, p.509). 
The PKR won only one seat in 2004. The election results were the consequence of public 
frustration about government suppression of peaceful protests, corruption, inflation, and 
widespread discontent (Freedom House). It is too early to analyze the effects of the elections 
of 2008 on the power-sharing arrangement in Malaysia. 
 
Table 5.1 Parliamentary elections results 
Year 
 
Party 
1974 
 
Seats 
1978 
 
Seats  
1982 
 
Seats 
1986 
 
Seats 
1990 
 
Seats 
1995 
 
Seats 
1999 2004 2008 
NF 87.7% 85.1% 85.7% 83.6% 70.6% 84.4% 76.7% 90.4% 63.1% 
PMIP - 3.2% 3.2% 0.5% 3.9% 3.6% 14% 3.2% 9.9% 
DAP 5.8% 10.4% 5.8% 13.5% 11.1% 4.7% 5.2% 5.5% 12.6% 
*Semangat 
‘46 
    4.4% 3.1% - - - 
Pekemas     7.8% 4.2% 1.5% - - 
PKR       2.6% 0.5% 14% 
Others 6.5% 1.3% 5.3% 2.4% 2.2% 0% 0% 0.4% 0.4% 
Total 
numbers of 
seats 
154 154 154 177 180 192 193 219 222 
Source: Crouch, p.75 *the Semangat ’46 was established after a split in UMNO  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed the power of the multi-party coalition that ruled Malaysia for a long 
time. The NF protected minorities, ethnic interests, and offered proportional representation of 
the political parties which were part of the NF. Thus, important aspects of a consensus 
democracy were present in Malaysia which contributed to creating healthy cabinet coalitions 
and multi-ethnic parliaments. Furthermore, the analysis showed that it is insufficient to 
assume that political parties are only driven by polarizing strategies to win votes. Instead, it is 
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important to analyze the political system in order to understand why a country like Malaysia 
experienced ethnic peace for such a long time.  
 Malaysia’s political elite managed to secure ethnic harmony and peace before and 
after 1969 by cooperating and using power-sharing arrangements. The difference, however, is 
that after the ethnic violence of 1969, improved interethnic relations on both the political and 
mass levels were absolutely essential to restore and maintain the ethnic peace in Malaysia. For 
the first time in Malaysia, the situation of 1969 created great insecurities for the Malays about 
their future and interests, which then led to anti-Chinese riots and ethnic violence. Because of 
the quick and effective response of the Malaysian government the violence was ended by 
installing an emergency cabinet and by focusing on the Malay socio-economic 
underdeveloped position. In addition, national unity and improved ethnic relations became the 
focus of the government to make sure that a situation like that of 1969 would never occur 
again. The government has been successful in taking away many of the Malays frustration by 
educating them and creating a Malay business community. In addition, the economic 
development was advantageous to all Malaysians. These positive developments in business, 
together with the Chinese fear of future anti-Chinese attacks, the restrictions on political 
freedoms, and the multi-ethnic character and interests of the NF, made it possible for the NF 
to stay in power. In the end the NF coalitions and its objective to assist in improving ethnic 
relations in formal organizations were central in preserving ethnic peace in Malaysia after 
1969. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Today the eruption of ethnic violence does not seem likely in Malaysia for a number of 
reasons. To begin with the economic development of the country, violence would harm the 
business sector and the country’s economic growth. Moreover, the socioeconomic position of 
the Malays improved increasingly, hence there is no reason for the Malays to blame the 
Chinese anymore. In addition, the restrictions on political freedom, press, trade unions, and 
public debates and demonstrations made it more difficult to collectively attack one group or 
the government. More importantly, the multi-ethnic grand coalition, the NF, accepted more 
political parties and created a bigger platform for different ethnic parties to cooperate and 
negotiate with one another. These aspects are indicative of the long term effects of the NEP 
and its successor, the NDP.  
In addition, even though the NEP introduced radical policies of which some affected 
the Chinese businesses significantly, the Chinese did not initiate violent riots against Malays. 
Part of the explanation is that the Chinese are a minority and their political power was smaller 
than that of the Malays. More importantly, however, is that the government promised the 
preservation of the security of the Chinese Malaysians (Beeson, p.133). Another reason is that 
the Chinese are intra-ethnically divided about political issues and are primarily concerned 
with doing business. As long as the government tries everything, even during recession, to 
stimulate the business sector, the Chinese have no real incentive to riot, despite some 
frustration about the positive discrimination of the Malays.  
 Another point is that it would be too easy to conclude that economic growth and the 
improved socio-economic position of the Malays made ethnic violence less likely. The reason 
is that one could expect that in times of recession and economic downturns, tensions in a 
fragmented society would flare up and result in ethnic violence as frustrations and anger could 
be vent out along ethnic lines. This is what happened in 1967 in Penang, but was not repeated 
on the same scale in the 1980s, during the economic recession in Malaysia. In the 1980s there 
were some demonstrations which incidentally involved violence, but it never turned into riots 
such as experienced in 1967 and 1969. This thesis, therefore, analyzed the NEP and its radical 
policies and how it affected interethnic civic engagement. 
 The focus on the dimensions of interethnic civic engagement and political cooperation 
contributed to a better understanding of the ethnic peace in Malaysia. To begin with the social 
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dimension of interethnic civic engagement, the conclusion is that double standards were 
applied in the education system in favor of the Malays. The slow implementation of education 
policies, double standards, and the increase in private schools and universities, created great 
obstacles for stimulating interethnic civic engagement in the education system. In addition, 
the Malaysian constitution contained articles that encouraged the positive discrimination of 
the Malays, as they were the bumiputras, and gave preference to Bahasa Malay as the medium 
of instruction in schools. The government tried to create national unity by making Malay the 
medium of instruction and improve the accessibility and quality of schools for Malays. 
However, in practice, ethnic segregation continued after 1969 because primary schools 
remained completely segregated, in secondary education different types of schools were 
allowed, and public universities consisted mainly of Malay students. 
 Even though the education system is considered important in spreading shared norms 
and values, segregation in the education system, as Lijphart argued, is a common feature in a 
consensus democracy. Therefore it is important to focus on the economic dimension of 
interethnic civic engagement, as the NEP was mainly concerned with the economic 
development of Malaysia. The improvement in interethnic civic engagement along this 
dimension is a fact and important for ethnic relations. The absence of violent ethnic riots in 
the 1980s and 1990s, when there were economic crises, proves that the closer cooperation in 
the business sector and the creation of an economic symbiosis contributed to preventing 
ethnic violence. Because Malaysia was depending heavily on the economy, especially in the 
1980s, interethnic civic engagement along the economic dimension is considered a key aspect 
in reaching a conclusion on the causal relation between civic engagement and presence or 
absence of ethnic violence. 
After analyzing the dimensions of interethnic civic engagement, we now know that for 
the Malays the NEP was successful in improving the education system and granting Malays 
access to the business sector. However, after 1969 ethnic segregation continued in the 
education system, whereas in the business sector interethnic civic engagement increased. As 
the majority of Chinese Malaysians were active in the business sector, it would be fair to say 
that the positive results for interethnic civic engagement along the economic dimension weigh 
heavier than the less satisfying interethnic civic engagement results along the social 
dimension.  Consequently, what can be said is that the argument of formal organizations, 
which underlines the importance of interethnic civic engagement through formal 
organizations in order to create and maintain ethnic peace, definitely fits this case. In addition, 
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political parties and their ethnic orientation were one of the root causes of the riots in Kuala 
Lumpur. Lijphart explains the importance of cooperation between political elites in creating 
political stability. An important note is that without political cooperation and stability, 
interethnic civic engagement in the society is difficult.  
 To answer the research question, does civic engagement influence the presence of 
ethnic violence, the answer is yes. The reason is that civic engagement between the ethnic 
groups created trust and facilitated communication through the formal organizations. 
Additionally, it acted as a constraint on polarizing strategies of political parties. To illustrate 
the latter, the NF ruled the country effectively since 1957, but to restore and maintain ethnic 
peace Malaysia had to improve the interethnic relations after 1969. Both interethnic civic 
engagement and elements from a consensus democracy proved to be important in the 
fragmented Malaysian society to create and maintain ethnic peace after a turbulent period.  
Malaysia could still be categorized as a deviant case because interethnic civic 
engagement alone could not explain the ethnic peace in this country as the power-sharing 
arrangement was equally important in creating this ethnic peace. In particular, there was a 
strong dislike of the Chinese community by the Malay political parties who had great political 
power, but the consensus democracy where the NF created a multi-ethnic coalition moved 
beyond ethnic differences in order to create an effective coalition where all ethnic groups 
were represented. The NF took this step to rule the country, and to build up the nation by 
focusing on industrialization and economic growth. Thus, in order to stimulate interethnic 
civic engagement support from the government for this was necessary. The conclusion is that 
to explain the ethnic peace in the fragmented society of Malaysia, Varshney’s argument that 
formal organizations foster interethnic civic engagement and thus lead to ethnic peace is not 
enough to explain the absence of ethnic violence, but features of the consensus democracy of 
Malaysia are equally important. 
On a final note, to preserve the ethnic peace in Malaysia, it can be recommended to the 
government that interethnic civic engagement should be strongly encouraged in the business 
sector as well as the primary, secondary, and tertiary schools. Education is once again 
emphasized here because the younger generations will only learn about different cultures and 
ethnicities when they engage with ethnic others in schools. Civic engagement determines 
children’s understanding of who the ethnic other is and enables children to break away from 
prejudices and negative stereotypes about ethnic groups in the society.   
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